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Stare Decisis in Historical
Perspective: From the Founding
Era to the Rehnquist Court
Thomas R. Lee 52 Vand. L. Rev. 647 (1999)
As numerous statistical studies have noted, the modern Supreme
Court has overruled itself at a rate that far exceeds that which prevailed dur-
ing the Court's early years. But is the accelerated rate a result of a decay in
the Court's doctrine of stare decisis? Several critics have presumed so without
engaging in any historical analysis. In this Article, Professor Lee offers a de-
tailed historical examination of the evolution of the Supreme Court's overrul-
ing rhetoric. The author traces the evolution of important strands of the
Rehnquist Court's doctrine of stare decisis from founding-era treatises to early
applications in the Marshall and Taney Courts.
For the most part, Professor Lee concludes that the internal inconsis-
tencies and contradictions in the Rehnquist Court's overruling rhetoric are the
product of an inherent tension in the countervailing policies at stake, not of a
recent deterioration of historically stringent standards of stare decisis. In the
founding era, as in the Rehnquist Court, the primary tension in the doctrine
concerned the extent of the Court's power to overrule decisions now deemed er-
roneous. The solution conceived in the founding era and applied in the
Marshall Court was the recognition of a single exception to the rule of stare
decisis, an exception that charted a compromise course between the extreme
positions advocated in the Rehnquist Court's opinions. History also supports
the Rehnquist Court's notion that the rule of stare decisis is strongest in cases
involving commercial reliance interests, but that error-correction is freely
available where no such interests are at stake.
Professor Lee identifies one strand of the Rehnquist Court's doctrine of
precedent that does appear to be a product of the twentieth century. The no-
tion that the constitutional or statutory nature of a precedent affects its sus-
ceptibility to reversal was largely rejected in the founding era and did not gain
majority support until well into the twentieth century.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's doctrine of stare decisis has been vari-
ously condemned as a "backwater of the law,"1 "a mask hiding other
considerations,"2 and a matter of "convenience, to both conservatives
and liberals," whose "friends... are determined by the needs of the
moment."3 Some critics presume that the unprincipled state of the
doctrine is the product of a relatively recent process of deterioration.
Justice Scalia, for one, has complained that the past decades have
been "marked by a new found disregard for stare decisis:"
As one commentator calculated, "[bly 1959, the number of instances in which
the Court had reversals involving constitutional issues had grown to sixty; in
the two decades which followed, the Court overruled constitutional cases on no
less than forty-seven occasions." It was an era when this Court cast overboard
numerous settled decisions, and indeed even whole areas of law, with an un-
ceremonious "heave-ho."4
Almost a century ago, one commentator lauded the eventual
disappearance of the doctrine of stare decisis as "the inevitable course
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 422, 422 (1988). Despite this and other epithets, Easterbrook concludes that the absence of
a principled theory of stare decisis is a necessary evil. See id. at 422-24 (asserting that we "do
not have-never can have-a comprehensive theory of precedent, any more than we can have a
complete theory of the just price' of wheat, or of when to spend more time studying the attrib-
utes of securities").
2. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 743 (1988).
3. Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1988); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent
in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 72 (1991) (noting that
"conservatives criticize the Warren Court's disregard for precedents, but not the Rehnquist
Court's assault on liberal precedents," while "liberals denounce the Rehnquist Court's attacks on
their icons, but not the Warren and Burger Courts' overrulings of conservative precedents").
4. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 108-09 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law,
1980 WIS. L. REV. 467,467).
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of human progress."r Since then, some scholars have asserted, with
little or no historical analysis, that this prophecy has been fulfilled,
and that the Supreme Court's standards of stare decisis have sub-
stantially deteriorated.6 To paraphrase Justice Scalia, the Justices of
the early Supreme Court are thought to have jettisoned past decisions
only after solemn and careful consideration of certain strict guiding
principles of precedent, whereas current members of the Court are
seen as participating in an "unceremonious 'heave-ho'" of both the
prior decisions and the previously applicable standards of stare deci-
sis.7 Indeed, Scalia has subsequently suggested that "the doctrine of
stare decisis has appreciably eroded" in the modern era.s
Scalia's statistical assertion is undoubtedly accurate. There is
no question that the Justices in the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury have "cast overboard" significantly more "settled decisions" than
their predecessors. 9 Absent further analysis, however, this explana-
tion for the statistical phenomenon seems less than obvious. For one
thing, today's vast body of constitutional case law presents an ever-
expanding target of "settled decisions" that may affect the issues that
come before the Court. Whereas the Court in Chief Justice Marshall's
day consistently wrote on a clean slate as it addressed fundamental
questions of constitutional law, today's Court routinely is faced with
the task of reconciling or distinguishing prior decisions.10
It is not only the number, but also the nature of Supreme
Court precedents that may affect the statistics. As noted in detail
below, the Court has long held that certain kinds of decisions
(principally those affecting property rights) are entitled to an en-
5. Edward B. Whitney, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 3 MICH. L. REV. 89, 94 (1904).
6. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 388
(1981) (The general decay of stare decisis reflects more than the need of a rapidly changing so-
ciety for new accommodating principles. It is the manifestation in legal thought of the marked,
accelerating, and apparently irreversible decline in the belief of permanent ordering.., a devel-
opment that has been in 'progress' since the seventeenth century.").
7. Harper, 509 U.S. at 108-09; see also Carolyn D. Richmond, Note, The Rehnquist Court:
What Is in Store for Constitutional Law Precedent?, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 511, 512 (1994)
(Mhe standards have become so distorted that stare decisis may no longer be relied upon as a
consistent indicator of the direction of constitutional law jurisprudence in the Supreme Court.").
8. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in 18 THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMANVALUES 79, 87 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1997).
9. See Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent: An Analysis of Natural
Courts and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262, 263 tbl.1 (1992) (indicating that 56.3% of all
reversals from 1789 to 1991 occurred between 1953 and 1991, and that 33.9% occurred between
1969 and 1991).
10. See Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 78 (1991) (asserting that 'i[t is practically impossible




hanced level of deference. In the days of Swift v. Tyson," the Court
often focused its efforts on important matters affecting property
rights.12 Today's Court has been criticized for eschewing important
commercial issues in favor of high-profile questions of constitutional
significance. 13 It should hardly be surprising that a Court that de-
voted its attention to cases involving property rights would maintain
a relatively stable body of precedent in comparison to a Court that
now focuses more substantially on questions of constitutional law.
These and other factors 14 could explain the twentieth-century Court's
increasing tendency to overrule its prior decisions, even if the prevail-
ing doctrine of stare decisis had remained relatively constant.
Without the baggage of an implication from statistics, the
stage is set for an examination of the premise that the Supreme
Court's principles of precedent have been significantly loosened in re-
cent decades. This Article examines that heretofore unexplored
premise by tracing the primary aspects of the Rehnquist Court's doc-
trine of stare decisis from founding-era commentary to their origins in
decisions of the Supreme Court.15 In so doing, the Article need not
11. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12. See BERNARD SCHWAmrZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 52 (1993) (noting that
during the Marshall years, "[m]any of the cases involved adjudication of real property disputes,
and the decisions furthered the change in the legal conception of land from a static locus to a
commodity that could be bought and sold in a market economy").
13. See Kenneth W. Starr, Rule of Trivial Pursuits at the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 1993, at A17.
14. One statistical study has suggested, for example, that the Courts that have dispropor-
tionately altered precedent have been characterized by significant changes in membership. See
Banks, supra note 9, at 263. A familiar example is the Hughes Court, which overturned 15
precedents during its last nine years after the Court's entire membership was transformed be-
tween 1937 and 1941. See id. at 265-66, 266 tbl.3. Similarly, most of the Warren Court's deci-
sions overruling precedent were handed down after Justice Frankfurter's retirement in 1962,
while most of the Burger Court's overruling decisions came after Douglas' retirement in 1975.
See id. at 266-68, 266 tbl.3. These Courts' increased willingness to overturn precedents may be
best explained by significant changes in the Court's membership, and not necessarily by any
overt adjustment in the Court's doctrine of precedent. Indeed, this phenomenon of reversal logi-
cally would tend to compound itself over time. Courts have long held that decisions that them-
selves ignore precedent are particularly susceptible to reversal. See discussion infra accompa-
nying note 201. Thus, one Court's willingness to ignore past precedent would logically invite
future reversals even without a deterioration in the doctrine.
15. The discussion will focus on the legal doctrine as it existed at the time of the founding
and as it has evolved in opinions of the Court over the past two centuries. Thus, the Article will
not have occasion to examine any of several extra-doctrinal variables that may (and probably
do) affect the outcomes and voting patterns in the Court's decisions as to whether to overrule
precedent. See, e.g., SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION
OF PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992, at 110 (1995) ("The Vinson, Warren, Burger,
and Rehnquist Courts overwhelmingly overturned precedents because of the ideology-the per-
sonal policy preferences-of their members. Conservative justices, such as the majority of those
650 [Vol. 52:647
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presuppose agreement about an originalist theory of stare decisis.
Whether or not one accepts the notion that stare decisis inheres in the
judicial power conferred in Article 111,16 the argument could certainly
be made that the founding generation must have contemplated that
this common-law doctrine of judicial management did not foreclose
further development of the considerations that inform the decision
whether to retain a judicial precedent. Thus, even under an
originalist conception of the judicial power, further development of the
standards of stare decisis need not be rejected categorically as
ahistorical.
But that concession does not render history irrelevant. Newly
minted standards of stare decisis need not be rejected automatically,
but they may be properly subjected to increased scrutiny. To the ex-
tent that speculation about the modern deterioration of stare decisis
is accurate, the points of deterioration may merit further examination
by courts and commentators.
After an initial summary of the Rehnquist Court's stare decisis
standards in Part II, this Article traces three principal strands of the
modern Court's overruling rhetoric from founding-era commentary to
their initial applications in decisions of the Supreme Court. For the
most part, this Article concludes that the modern muddle over stare
decisis has been with us since the founding era. Thus, whereas the
Rehnquist Court has often equivocated about its power to overturn
precedent based on a current perception of error, Part III first
establishes that similar doctrinal tensions trace their origins to early
American commentary and to decisions of the Marshall Court.
Second, although the Rehnquist Court's notion that stare decisis is
most powerful in cases involving vested property rights is sometimes
challenged as ahistorical, Part IV identifies founding-era commentary
on this issue and traces its application in early Supreme Court
decisions. Finally, Part V identifies one strand of the Rehnquist
Court's overruling rhetoric that is a product of the twentieth century.
who sat on the Rehnquist Court, formally altered liberal precedents. In contrast, the liberal
overrulings of the later Warren Court voided conservative precedents.").
16. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article II, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1997, 1997 (1994) ("[Tjhe
precept that like cases should be treated alike-4is] rooted... in Article IIs invocation of the
Judicial Power.' "); Monaghan, supra note 2, at 754 (noting the theory that "the principle of
stare decisis inheres in the Judicial power' of article Ill"); cf Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514
U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (suggesting that an attempt by Congress to reopen a final judgment may
violate a "postulate" of Article III). But see Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 23, 29-30 (1994) (arguing that the 'judicial [plower" in-
cludes a "structural inference" that "the Constitution is supreme.., over all competing sources
of law," including precedent).
1999]
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The modern dichotomy that allocates deference based on the statutory
or constitutional basis of the precedent finds no support in the
founding era and very little support in Supreme Court decisions of the
nineteenth century.
II. STARE DECISIS IN THE MODERN COURT: POLICIES AND PRACTICES
The proper treatment of precedent, like any complex issue, in-
volves a careful balance of competing goals. The task of identifying
the competing policies is straightforward. On one side of the ledger
(the side favoring adherence to past decisions), the Court has recog-
nized the policies of economy, stability, and legitimacy.'7
The economies of a system of precedent are obvious. As
Justice (then-Judge) Cardozo once noted, "Itihe labor of judges would
be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could
be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of
bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had
gone before him."8 Thus, a general rule of adherence to precedent
"expedites the work of the courts by preventing the constant reconsid-
eration of settled questions."19
The policy of stability may encompass any of several related
concerns. First is the goal of assuring stability in commercial rela-
tionships. In some cases, contracts or title to property may be prem-
ised on a rule established by case law; overruling such precedent
17. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("Stare de*isis is the preferred
course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived in-
tegrity of the judicial process."). Other considerations in favor of adherence to precedent have
been identified in academic commentary. See Monaghan, supra note 2, at 744-53 (arguing that
precedents help limit the Court's agenda, illuminate areas in which the Court has been consis-
tently divided, and legitimate judicial review); Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment
Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 67, 70 (1988)
(asserting that a "doctrine of precedent" promotes, inter alia, efficient decisionmaking,
"predictability in our affairs," and increased attention to the "stakes" of resolving a legal dis-
pute). See generally RICHARD A. WASSERSTOM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 56-83 (1961)
(identifying certainty, consistency, fairness, equality, efficiency, and predictability as
justifications for adherence to precedent).
18. BENJAMINN. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIciAL PROCESS 149(1921).
19. Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV. 409,
410 (1924); see also Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 423 (asserting that "[p]recedent decentralizes
decisionmaking" and "economizes on information"); Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and
External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 102 (1989) (noting that
stare decisis enables judges "to avoid having to rethink the merits of particular legal doctrine"
in many cases).
652 [Vol. 52:647
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would undermine vested contract and property rights.20 Second, even
where vested commercial rights are not implicated, a doctrine of reli-
ance on precedent furthers the goal of stability by enabling parties to
settle their disputes without resorting to the courts.21 Finally, the
Court has sometimes suggested that the goal of stability encompasses
reliance interests that extend beyond the commercial context, includ-
ing the preservation of "the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable ex-
pectations,"22 or even the retention of governmental action undertaken
in reliance on precedent. 23
Stare decisis is also thought to preserve the Court's legitimacy.
Under this view, public respect depends on a perception that the
Court's decisions are governed by the rule of law, and not by the va-
garies of the political process. 24 In Justice Thurgood Marshall's
words, stare decisis "contributes to the integrity of our constitutional
system of government, both in appearance and in fact," by preserving
the presumption "that bedrock principles are founded in the law
rather than in the proclivities of individuals."2
Blind adherence to precedent in all cases, however, threatens
to undermine the principal policy on the other side of the stare decisis
20. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (noting that "[clonsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at
their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are in-
volved"); see also infra text accompanying notes 214-34.
2L See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,403 (1970).
22. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940); cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., plurality opinion) (asserting that
relevant reliance interests include admittedly immeasurable "ordering" of the "thinking and
living" of women who understood Roe v. Wade to recognize a constitutional right to an abortion).
23. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (suggesting that approval of the Seventeenth Amendment may have
been premised on the validity of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)), overruled by Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also infra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
24. See Maltz, supra note 4, at 484:
The Court's continued ability to function effectively in this structure as the ultimate
arbiter of constitutional law depends on the willingness of the public to accept the Court
in this role; this acceptance in turn depends upon the public perception that in each case
the majority of the Court is speaking for the Constitution itself rather than simply for
five or more lawyers in black robes.
25. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986); see also Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403
(suggesting that stare decisis preserves the perception of "the judiciary as a source of imper-
sonal and reasoned judgments"). But see Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scala, J., concurring) (arguing
that "the notion that an important constitutional decision with plainly inadequate rational sup-
port must be left in place for the sole reason that it once attracted five votes" would undermine
the Court's legitimacy); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("'The jurist concerned with 'public confidence in, and acceptance of the judicial system' might
well consider that, however admirable its resolute adherence to the law as it was, a decision
contrary to the public sense of justice as it is, operates, so far as it is known, to diminish respect
for the courts and for law itself.'" (quoting Peter L. Szanton, Stare Decisis: A Dissenting View,
10 HASTINGS L.J. 394,397 (1959))).
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ledger: assuring accurate judicial decisions that faithfully apply
correct principles of law. Judges are fallible and an ironclad
requirement of adherence to precedent in all cases would transform
the doctrine of stare decisis into an "imprisonment of reason,"26 re-
quiring the perpetuation of an error in future cases for the sole reason
that it was once enshrined as case law by the votes of five Justices.27
Thus, the countervailing interest in accurate legal judgments must be
weighed against the above policies of stability and legitimacy. The
result is a fragile doctrine under which the Court "must seek princi-
ples of change no less than principles of stability."28
With these competing policies in mind, the most basic question
that any system of precedent must answer is whether a prior decision
is entitled to deference when it is later thought to be in error. In run-
of-the-mill cases, the policy of judicial economy dictates adherence to
precedent in order to economize the resources involved in reinventing
the legal wheel in each case. To borrow Justice Cardozo's terms, the
Supreme Court's workload would be pressed beyond "the breaking
point29 if it were to reexamine every possible issue presented in every
case, right down to a daily reconsideration of the very foundations of
judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison.30 But the Cardozo
efficiency argument begs all of the important questions. The difficult
issue for any system of precedent is not whether a court may rely on
precedent in the run-of-the-mill case, but whether it must do so when
it perceives an error in the ways of the past.
The modem Court has sent conflicting signals as to the effect
of a current perception of error in a past decision. On one hand, the
Court has suggested that stare decisis cannot require blind adherence
to plainly erroneous decisions;31 if it did, a principal goal of the doc-
trine would be undermined because public confidence in the Court de-
pends on an ability to correct clear defects in past decisions. On the
other hand, an exception to the rule of stare decisis that openly in-
vites a reexamination of the rationality or justice of prior precedents
threatens to swallow the rule. With this concern in mind, the Court
26. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 249 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that stare decisis is used for a purpose, and that the application of the
doctrine to uphold baseball in an antitrust challenge was not arbitrary).
27. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. RoscOE PouND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923); see also Easterbrook,
supra note 1, at 423 (suggesting that the "possibility of improvement makes precedent unsta-
ble," and indeed that "[iut ought to be unstable").
29. CARDOZO, supra note 18, at 149.
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
31. See infra notes 42-45, 52-58 and accompanying text.
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has sometimes offered the contradictory suggestion that the basis for
overruling an earlier decision must go beyond the identification of an
error.3 2 4
The above conflict in the Court's overruling rhetoric is further
complicated by a number of other factors that are sometimes intro-
duced into the Court's decisions. The Rehnquist Court has suggested,
for example, that its capacity for error correction may be enhanced
where an earlier decision has been undermined (although not actually
overruled) by subsequent authority.33 It has also asserted that its
power to correct erroneous precedent may depend on whether and to
what extent a reversal of course in the Court's jurisprudence would
upset reliance interests.34 Under this view, even clear errors in
precedent should be preserved where substantial commercial reliance
interests are at stake, but error correction is freely available where
they are not.35 Finally, the Rehnquist Court has frequently indicated
that its power to correct erroneous precedents may depend on the
statutory or constitutional nature of the decision.36 Whereas the
Court purports to give "great weight to stare decisis in the area of
statutory construction,"$7 it has also claimed that the doctrine "is at
its weakest when [it] interpret[s] the Constitution."
38
III. STARE DECISIS AND ERROR CORRECTION
The conflicted state of the modern Court's overruling rhetoric
is nowhere more evident than on the basic question of the Court's ca-
pacity to correct the errors of the past. Justice Scalia argued in favor
of an error-correction standard in his concurrence in Payne v.
Tennessee,39 in which the Court set aside Booth v. Maryland and
32. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). For
further discussion of this conflict in the Court's overruling rhetoric, see the discussion infra ac-
companying notes 39-63.
33. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-38 (1997). For further analysis, see the
discussion infra accompanying notes 374-79.
34. See infra Part 1V.C.
35. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992); see also Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). This strand of analysis is discussed in further detail in
Part IV.
36. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (suggesting that "the doctrine of
stare decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents"); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (claiming the Court has a "considered practice not to apply stare decisis
as rigidly in constitutional as in nonconstitutional cases").
37. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996).
38. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235.
39. Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19991 655
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South Carolina v. Gathers4° in holding that the Eighth Amendment
does not preclude the admission of victim-impact evidence. 41 As
Scalia noted, Justice Marshall's dissenting argument in Payne was
that stare decisis "demands of us some 'special justification'-beyond
the mere conviction that the rule of Booth significantly harms our
criminal justice system and is egregiously wrong-before we can be
absolved of exercising 'power, not reason.' "42 Scalia responded in his
characteristically energetic fashion:
I do not think that is fair. In fact, quite to the contrary, what would enshrine
pow.er as the governing principle of this Court is the notion that an important
constitutional decision with plainly inadequate rational support must be left in
place for the sole reason that it once attracted five votes.4
Other members of the Court have offered variations on this
theme in several other opinions. In several cases, Justice Stevens has
quoted Justice Cardozo for a standard that purportedly would enable
the Court to overrule prior decisions on the basis of their inconsis-
tency with the current Justices' "sense of justice," the "social welfare,"
or the "mores of their day."" Elsewhere, Stevens has suggested that
the error-correction bar is substantially higher, indicating that the
Court's precedents should be set aside only if deemed "egregiously in-
correct."45 Finally, Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Mitchell v.
40. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805
(1989).
41. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 830.
42. Id. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
43. Id.
44. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 644-45 & n.4 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring (quoting CARnOZO, supra note 18, at 149, 150-52)); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S.- 160, 190-91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). This same standard appears in Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989).
In the course of refusing to overrule Runyon, which had held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits
racial discrimination in private contracts, the Patterson Court noted that "it has sometimes
been said that a precedent becomes more vulnerable as it becomes outdated and after being
"'tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the
social welfare."'" Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174 (quoting Runyon, 427 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 18, at 150)). Because the Patterson Court found
Runyon to be "entirely consistent" with "the prevailing sense of justice in this country" and with
"our society's deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or
the color of his or her skin," however, it concluded that this standard provided no basis for
abandoning Runyon. Id. at 174-75.
45. Compare Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450
U.S. 147, 153 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (adhering to Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974), despite his view that it incorrectly interpreted the Eleventh Amendment, on the ground
that it "had previously been endorsed by some of our finest Circuit Judges; [and] therefore can-
not be characterized as unreasonable or egregiously incorrect"), with Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that "additional study has
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W.T. Grant Co. concluded that it was the Court's "duty to reexamine a
precedent where its reasoning or understanding of the Constitution is
fairly called into question."4s
The Court's invocation of error as the basis for self-reversal is
sometimes masked in other terms, such as the notion that a previous
doctrinal position has proven unworkable in practice. The Court's
decision in United States v. Dixon illustrates this approach.47
Dixon overruled Grady v. Corbin, which had announced a same con-
duct test under the Double Jeopardy Clause-a test that prohibited
"[any] subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish
an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted."48 Prior to Grady, the Court had applied
only the same element test announced in Blockburger v. United States,
which asks whether each offense contains an element not contained in
the other.49 If not, they are the same offense and double jeopardy bars
additional punishment and successive prosecution. 0  Dixon
abandoned Grady and reverted to the same element test as the sole
inquiry under the Double Jeopardy Clause.5'
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court concluded that Grady
was vulnerable because it "contained 'less than accurate' historical
analysis," and had created confusion.62 In other words, in addition to
attacking the historical basis for Grady, the Dixon majority asserted
made it abundantly clear" that Edelman "can properly be characterized as 'egregiously incor-
rect" "), superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
Justice Harlan offered a comparable standard in his concurring opinion in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring), overruled by Monell v. Department of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In support of his view that the Court should adhere to its decisions
in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945),
that municipalities are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Harlan suggested that "the
policy of stare decisis... require[s] that it appear beyond doubt from the legislative history of
the 1871 statute that Classic and Screws misapprehended the meaning of the controlling
provision, before a departure from what was decided in those cases would be justified." Monroe,
365 U.S. at 192 (emphasis added).
46. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). In
Mitchell, the Court rejected a Due Process challenge to a state procedure allowing a seller to
sequester property upon an allegation of default by the buyer, without prior notice to the buyer
pending a hearing on the merits of the seller's claim. See id. at 619-20. The Court had
previously invalidated similar procedures in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972).
47. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
48. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990), overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. at 688.
49. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
50. See id.
51. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704.
52. Id. at 711.
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that the decision was "unworkable" or "unstable in application."53 In
support of these later conclusions, Scalia noted that the Court had
recognized a "large exception" to Grady's principle, that lower courts
had complained that Grady was "difficult to apply," and that Supreme
Court decisions interpreting Grady had resulted in divided opinions.4
Despite the euphemistic label of unworkability, Scalia's analy-
sis treated the perceived unworkability or confusion in application of
Grady as evidence of its error. The Court's exception to Grady, in
Scalia's view, "gave cause for concern that the rule was not an accu-
rate expression of the law."55 Ultimately, Scalia's analysis reduced to
his conclusion that "[t]he case was a mistake,"56 and his assertion that
Grady was vulnerable as "'unworkable or... badly reasoned' "57 did
not appear to accord independent significance to the notion of un-
workability.58
On other occasions, members of the modern Court have
soundly rejected the perception of error as a basis for overturning
precedent. Special justification, under this view, requires something
more than the conclusion that the Court's prior decision was irra-
53. Id. at 709, 712.
54 Id. at 709, 711 n.16.
55. Id. at 710.
56. Id. at 711.
57. Id. at 712 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)); ef BMW, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that "[w]hen... a con-
stitutional doctrine adopted by the Court is not only mistaken but also insusceptible of princi-
pled application, [he did] not feel bound to give it stare decisis effect-indeed, [he did] not feel
justified in doing so" (emphasis added)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 539-47 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which
was subject to reversal because its preclusion of congressional action under the Commerce
Clause "in areas of traditional governmental functions" was "unsound in principle and unwork-
able in practice").
The Court's reexamination of the merits of a precedent is also sometimes cast in terms of a
current perception of a change in conditions underlying the earlier decision. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863-64 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., plurality
opinion) (asserting that "a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and
above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided," but arguing that Brown v. Board of
Education properly overruled Plessy v. Ferguson in light of the fact that "the Plessy Court's ex-
planation for its decision was so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954");
see also id. at 960 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that
the joint opinion's explanation for Brown was "at best a feebly supported, post hoc rationaliza-
tion for [that] decision," and that the true basis for Brown was that Plessy was in error).
58. A brief hypothetical illustrates the point. Assume that the Fifth Amendment
expressly spelled out both the "same conduct" and the "same element" standards as tests for
double jeopardy. Under those circumstances, the presence of confusion or instability in
application of the same conduct test might call for greater clarity in the Supreme Court's expli-




tional or unjust.59 Justice Scalia recently offered his version of this
position in his concurring opinion in Hubbard v. United States.60 In
apparent contradiction of his concurring position in Payne,61 Scalia
asserted that the decision to set aside precedent must be supported by
"reasons that go beyond mere demonstration that the overruled opin-
ion was wrong."62 "Otherwise," Scalia explained, "the doctrine would
be no doctrine at all," and would accord an "'arbitrary discretion in
the courts.' "63
The above contradictions provide ample fodder for the cynical
response to the Rehnquist Court's doctrine of stare decisis. In light of
the above, common epithets thrown at the Court's overruling rhetoric
are understandable, perhaps even understated. But the unexamined
premise of many critics is that the current inconsistencies are a prod-
uct of the modern era. This Article examines that premise with an
initial focus on the extent to which the stare decisis principles of the
founding era and early Supreme Court endorsed the correction of er-
rors in precedent.
A. Evolution of the Doctrine at Common Law
Legal historians generally agree that the doctrine of stare de-
cisis is of relatively recent origin. At least as late as the early eight-
eenth century, common law judges and commentators acknowledged
that:
59. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., plurality opinion)
(asserting that the view has been "repeated in our casesi] that a decision to overrule should rest
on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided"); see
also Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 145 (asserting that the current Court has embraced two stare
decisis standards, one that permits the overruling of precedents "deemed erroneously reasoned,"
another that "demand[s] something more than erroneous reasoning").
60. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Hubbard held that the federal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, applied only to state-
ments made in the executive department. In so doing, the Court overruled United States v.
Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), which had extended § 1001 to statements made in legislative,
executive, and judicial departments. See Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 715.
61. The "apparent" contradiction may be explained by the fact that Payne overruled con-
stitutional precedent, while Hubbard was a statutory decision. This distinction is discussed in
further detail infra Part IV.
62. Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 716 (Scalia, J., concurring).
63. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) [hereinafter FEDERALIST No. 781). To Scalia, two reasons beyond the mere error of
Bramblett sustained its abandonment: (a) the "potential for mischief federal judges have discov-
ered in the mistaken reading of 18 U.S.C. § 1001"; and (b) the lack of any significant "reliance"
interests in Bramblett. Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 716-17. For further discussion of this aspect of
Hubbard, see the discussion infra accompanying notes 456-57.
1999] 659
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Decisions of Courts of Justice, tho' by Virtue of the Laws of this Realm they do
bind, as a Law between the Parties thereto, as to the particular Case in
Question, 'til revers'd by Error or Attaint, yet they do not make a Law
properly so called, (for that only the King and Parliament can do).
64
In other words, although judicial decisions were viewed as evidence of
the law,65 "the Year Books themselves... were not regarded as
collections of authoritative or binding decisions."
66
This attitude was the natural outgrowth of what is now re-
ferred to as the declaratory theory of the common law: The law had a
"Platonic or ideal existence" before any decision by the court, and that
any judicial declaration that was inconsistent with such ideal need
not be formally overruled but could merely be replaced with a new
decision as a "reconsidered declaration as law from the beginning."
6 7
In Lord Coke's metaphorical terms, the declaratory theory posited
that, "[i]t is the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the
law, according to the golden mete-wand of the law and not by the
crooked cord of discretion."68 This declaratory notion of common law
decisions presupposes a relatively weak (if not non-existent) doctrine
of stare' decisis. Far from demanding adherence to case law, the
classic declaratory theory left ample room for departing from
precedent under the fiction that prior decisions were not law in and of
themselves but were merely evidence of it.
64. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45 (Charles M. Gray
ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1713); see also C.K ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 209-19 (7th
ed. 1964); 12 WILLIAM HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 146 (1991); HAROLD POTTER,
POTTER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 275, 279 (A.K.R.
Kiralfy ed., Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 4th ed. 1958) ("In this period the judges did not regard
themselves as absolutely bound by earlier decisions, and this attitude of mind lasted well into
the fifteenth century, and in a modified form down to the nineteenth century.... During the
latter half of the seventeenth and during the eighteenth centuries we find cases constantly
followed in practice but a tendency to assert that they were not binding in theory.").
65. See HALE, supra note 64, at 45; see also 2 EDWARD COKE, COKE UPON LITTLETON 254(a)
(First American ed. 1853) (noting that reported decisions are "the best proofes [of] what the law
is").
66. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNET, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 346 (5th ed.
1956).
67. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932) (rejecting due
process challenge to Montana court's refusal to give retroactive effect to its decision overruling a
past decision).
68. 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 51
(London, E&R Brooke 1797) (1642).
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1. Blackstone's Commentaries and the Law of Precedent
There is no consensus as to precisely when the notion of case
law precedent gained currency in English common law. 69 But most
legal historians have agreed that the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries marked an important point of transition.70 During this pe-
riod, the English courts began to speak of a qualified obligation to
abide by past decisions. Under this view, the fiction of the declaratory
theory was retained, but common law judges were perceived to have a
duty to articulate some justification for setting aside the evidence of
the law found in prior decisions.
Although the precise timing of this step in the transition is a
subject of some debate among legal historians, William Blackstone's
influential Commentaries apparently was one of the early authorities
to speak of "the rule of precedent as one of general obligation."71
Blackstone first stated the general principle in seemingly strict terms:
"For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the
same points come again in litigation... ." 72 In support of this rule,
Blackstone offered policies that are consistent with those announced
by the modern Court. On one hand, adherence to precedent preserves
the integrity of the court; it is designed "to keep the scale of justice
even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opin-
69. See DANIEL H. CHAMBERLAIN, THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DEcmiS: ITS REASONS AND ITS
EXTENT 5 (1885) ("Precisely when [the doctrine of stare decisis] became a distinctly established
doctrine of English law is not easy to determine.").
70. See ALLEN, supra note 64, at 209 (noting that at least until the mid-eighteenth century
"the whole theory and practice of precedent was in a highly fluctuating condition");
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 64, at 151-57 (noting that the modern doctrine of precedent was ac-
cepted by the latter part of the eighteenth century, subject to "reservations," such as the "power
to disregard cases which are plainly absurd or contrary to principle"); PLUCKNETT, supra note
66, at 350 ("It is to the nineteenth century that we must look for the final stages ... of the
present system."); POTTER, supra note 64, at 279 (noting that during the eighteenth century
"[o]pinions differ as to the force of individual precedents"); Jim Evans, Change in the Doctrine of
Precedent During the Nineteenth Century, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 35 n.1 (Laurence Goldstein ed.,
1987) (noting changes in the British House of Lords' treatment of its own precedent during the
nineteenth century).
71. MAx RADIN, STABI=IY IN LAw 18 (1944). Blackstone's significant influence on the
Framers' understanding of the law has been widely acknowledged. See Schick v. United States,
195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904) (asserting that the Commentaries are "the most satisfactory exposition of
the common law of England," and that "undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were
familiar with it"); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIc, 1776-1787, at
10 (1969) (suggesting that "[tihe great appeal for Americans of Blackstone's Commentaries
stemmed not so much from its particular exposition of English law ... but from its great effort
to extract general principles from the English common law and make of it, as James Iredell
said, 'a science' ").
72. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *69.
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ion."73 Similarly, the doctrine is aimed at assuring stability in the
law:
[B]ecause the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what
before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent
rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from,
according to his own private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not ac-
cording to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and cus-
toms of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and
expound the old one.7 4
On the other hand, Blackstone acknowledged that countervailing
policies counsel against blind adherence to precedent in every case.
The "law" and the "opinion of the judge," noted Blackstone, "are not
always convertible terms, or one and the same thing; since it some-
times may happen that the judge may mistake the law."7
5
Blackstone's venerable statements on the law of precedent
(which coincide with the period in which the United States
Constitution was framed) seem to chart a compromise course between
the classic adoption of the declaratory theory and a strict notion of
stare decisis. According to Blackstone, the rule of adherence to
precedent was subject to one relatively straightforward (if potentially
rule-swallowing) exception: "Yet this rule admits of exception, where
the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much
more if it be contrary to the divine law."76 Blackstone proceeded to
explain this exception in terms of the declaratory theory:
But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new
law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found
that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that
such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the
established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined.
77
2. Early American Commentary on the Law of Precedent
The Framers' expectation that the federal courts would be
subject to some notion of binding precedent is evident in Alexander
Hamilton's argument in Federalist No. 78 in favor of strong job secu-
rity for federal judges. Hamilton first suggested that "a voluminous
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *71.
76. Id. at *69-70.
77. Id. at *70.
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code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with
the advantages of a free government." 8 "To avoid an arbitrary dis-
cretion in the courts," Hamilton continued, "it is indispensable that
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve
to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes
before them."79 Because such "precedents must unavoidably swell to a
very considerable bulk and must demand long and laborious study to
acquire a competent knowledge of them," Hamilton argued that "there
can be but few men in [] society who will have sufficient skill in the
laws to qualify them for the stations of judges," and thus that
"permanency of the judicial office[]" was necessary to lure such men to
federal judgeships.80
Viewed in isolation, Hamilton's side-bar on precedent might be
construed to conceive of a strict rule demanding adherence to prece-
dent under all circumstances. Hamilton wrote of a binding notion of
stare decisis under which precedents would define and point out the
duty of the court in every case. In Hamilton's view, the policies of
certainty and judicial integrity supported this doctrine: adherence to
"strict rules and precedents" is necessary "[t]o avoid an arbitrary dis-
cretion in the courts."1 Earlier in Federalist No. 78, Hamilton implic-
itly embraced the similar ideal of a court securing the "inflexible and
uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution."
82
But Federalist No. 78 was hardly conceived as a comprehensive
exposition of the doctrine of stare decisis, and Hamilton's statement of
a prima facie rule of adherence to precedent should not be construed
to exclude the existence of exceptions or countervailing considera-
tions. Hamilton's conception of a judge's duty was to follow not only
precedent, but "strict rules," which seems to be a reference to the
78. FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 63, at 471.
79. Id. Anti-Federalist commentary also made oblique reference to the notion of stare de-
cisis. The Federal Farmer was concerned, for example, that it was a "very dangerous thing to
vest in the same judge power to decide on the law, and also general powers in equity; for if the
law restrain him, he is only to step into his shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason
or opinion may dictate." Letters from The Federal Farmer No. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALiST 234, 244 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST]. The danger, in the Federal Farmer's view, was compounded by the fact that
the federal courts had "no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity
as in Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be mere discre-
tion." Id. For a detailed discussion of the Federalist/Anti-Federalist interchange on this and
related issues, see John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311,
1385-91 (1997), and John C. Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1155-57 (1996).
80. FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 63, at 471.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 470-71.
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lamentable "voluminous code of laws ... necessarily connected with
the advantages of a free government."83 In combination, strict rules
and precedents may define the court's duty, but a suggestion that
every case would be predetermined by the authority of case law alone
would have been specious. Nor is it clear that Hamilton was
discussing the question of whether the Supreme Court would have the
power to overrule its own decisions; Federalist No. 78 may simply
have been addressing a rule of vertical stare decisis requiring lower
federal courts to follow case law from a superior tribunal.84
Moreover, other founding-era commentators acknowledged
that the rule of stare decisis was subject to certain exceptions.
William Cranch, the second reporter of Supreme Court decisions, of-
fered some indication of his understanding of the role of reported
opinions in the preface to his first report.85 While echoing Hamilton's
view that reported opinions would "imit... discretion" and act as a
"check upon" judges, Cranch also maintained that the judge retained
the power to "decide a similar case differently," at least where he
"make[s] public [his] strong reasons for doing so."8
Like Blackstone and Cranch, James Madison conceived of a
rule of stare decisis that was tempered by countervailing policies and
exceptions.8 7 His views on this issue were expressed in letters justify-
ing his assent as President to the Bank of the United States, despite
the fact that he had questioned its constitutionality in 1791.8 In
justifying his change of heart, Madison relied principally on judicial
precedents upholding congressional power in this area.s9  Such
83. Id. at 471.
84. Cf 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§
377-78, at 257-59 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown, 2d ed. 1851). Story first posited a
"rule" similar to that espoused in FEDERALIST No. 78 that "judicial decisions of the highest
tribunal, by the known course of the common law, are considered, as establishing the true
construction of the laws which are brought into controversy before it," and that "the principles of
the decision are held, as precedents and authority, to bind future cases of the same nature." Id.
§ 377, at 258. But Story's treatment of stare decisis addressed the question of adherence of
lower courts to Supreme Court decisions (stare decisis on a "vertical" plane), and not whether
the Court had the power to overrule itself (stare decisis on a "horizontal" plane). See id. § 378,
at 258-59 (asserting that "this conclusive effect of judicial adjudications," which "was in the full
view of the framers of the constitution," suggests that "the judgments of the courts of the United
States" were "plainly supposed to be of paramount and absolute obligation throughout all the
states").
85. Cranch's Preface, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii (1804).
86. Id. at iii-iv.
87. See Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted
in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 391
(Marvin Meyers ed., revised ed. 1981) [hereinafter MIND OF THE FOUNDER].
88. See id. at 390.
89. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the national bank).
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"precedents, when formed on due discussion and consideration, and
deliberately sanctioned by reviews and repetitions," were in Madison's
view "regarded as of binding influence, or, rather, of authoritative
force in settling the meaning of a law."9° Madison offered two policy
justifications in favor of the binding or authoritative force of
precedent:
1st. Because it is a reasonable and established axiom, that the good of society
requires that the rules of conduct of its members should be certain and known,
which would not be the case if any judge, disregarding the decision of his
predecessors, should vary the rule of law according to his individual interpre-
tation of it.... 2. Because an exposition of the law publicly made, and repeat-
edly confirmed by the constituted authority, carries with it, by fair inference,
the sanction of those who, having made the law through their legislative or-
gan, appear, under such circumstances, to have determined its meaning
through their judiciary organ.91
Madison's discussion of this issue probed deeper than
Hamilton's treatment in Federalist No. 78. In addition to espousing
the general rule, Madison also acknowledged a limitation on the gen-
eral principle: "That cases may occur which transcend all authority of
precedents must be admitted, but they form exceptions which will
speak for themselves and must justify themselves."92 Unfortunately,
Madison stopped short of offering a comprehensive discussion of his
understanding of the applicable exceptions to the rule. But his treat-
ment of the extent of the precedential effect of a decision acknowl-
edged that at some point a decision that completely disregards the
underlying provision of law should not be followed:
There has been a fallacy... in confounding a question whether precedents
could expound a Constitution, with a question whether they could alter a
Const. [sic] This distinction is too obvious to need elucidation. None will deny
that precedents of a certain description fix the interpretation of a law. Yet who
will pretend that they can repeal or alter a law?
93
Thus, in Madison's view, a precedent that is thought to expound or
interpret the law or the Constitution is worthy of deference, but once
90. Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in
MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 87, at 391.
9L Id.
92. Letter from James Madison to C.E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 1831), reprinted in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 443 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON].
93. Letter from Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 92, at 477.
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the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law,
it should be rejected.
James Kent's influential Commentaries on American Law set
forth a similar approach. Kent followed Blackstone in conceiving of
precedent in terms of the declaratory theory. "A solemn decision upon
a point of law, arising in any given case," said Kent, "becomes an
authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which we
can have of the law applicable to the subject."s4 But also like
Blackstone, Kent tempered the declaratory theory with a conditional
duty to adhere to precedent, subject to an exception that recognized a
power of error correction:
[Tihe judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed,
unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that
particular case. If a decision has been made upon solemn argument and ma-
ture deliberation, the presumption is in favor of its correctness; and the com-
munity have a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law,
and to regulate their actions and contracts by it.95
B. Stare Decisis in the Marshall Court: Binding Precedent
or Mere Evidence of the Law?
The founding-era doctrine of precedent thus was in an uneasy
state of internal conflict. On one hand, the framing generation per-
ceived the importance of stability and certainty in the law, and thus
embraced a rule of following past decisions. On the other hand, a de-
claratory understanding of the common law gave rise to an exception
permitting some form of reexamination of the merits of a prior deci-
sion. The unresolved tension involves the interplay between these
two propositions. A strong rule threatens permanently to enshrine
the errors of the past with no hope for internal correction, while a
pure declaratory exception swallows the rule and its aim of stability.
The history of the Supreme Court's treatment of precedent
may be understood as an evolution of its various attempts to balance
these competing concerns. That history begins in the Marshall
Court, 96 whose decisions indicate an unresolved tension between a
94. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARiES ON AMERICAN LAw *475 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 14th
ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1896) (emphasis added).
95. Id. at *475-76.
96. No decisions prior to Chief Justice Marshall's tenure overruled precedent, see Banks,
supra note 9, at 263 note to tbl.1 ("[Tihere were no overturns for the Jay (1789 to 1795),
Rutledge (1795 to 1795) or Ellsworth (1796 to 1800) tenures .... ."); or offered any substantive
discussion of its importance.
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rule of stare decisis and an exception born of the founding-era de-
claratory theory.
1. The Marshall Court and the Declaratory Theory
An argument could be made that Chief Justice Marshall's
opinions indicate that he attached little significance to precedent.
Marshall often engaged in lengthy doctrinal expositions on settled is-
sues that today would be disposed of with a simple citation. As David
Currie has indicated, "precedent, while not wholly foreign to
Marshall's opinions, was seldom prominent there."97  Currie offers
several illustrations of his view that Marshall had a "general disdain
for reliance on authority," and that "i]t was typical of Marshall not to
cite even his own opinions although they squarely supported him."98
Cohens v. Virginia9 is one example of this approach. The
Cohens had been convicted in state court in Virginia of selling lottery
tickets in Virginia. In its attempt to convince the Court that it lacked
jurisdiction over this appeal, the State argued, among other things,
that the Court's appellate jurisdiction extended only to cases decided
in the lower federal courts. The issue had been conclusively resolved
to the contrary just five years earlier in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,'°°
but Marshall's opinion for the Court embarked on a lengthy analytical
discussion before rejecting the argument.1'0
Marshall's approach in McCulloch v. Marylando2 was similar.
In concluding that formation of a national bank was a necessary and
proper exercise of powers expressly given to Congress, Marshall re-
jected the argument that this clause was not limited to "those single
means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable."103
Marshall himself had reached the same conclusion fourteen years
97. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal
Courts, 1801-1835,49 U. Cli. L. REV. 646, 680 (1982).
98. DAvIn P. CURRiE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789-1888, at 98, 163 (1985). Currie notes: "Rare is the judge today who would disdain
such support and rely wholly upon the force of his own argument, but his later opinions were to
show that Marshall often paid little heed to precedents even when they squarely supported
him." Id. at 70.
99. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 440 (1821).
100. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,351 (1816).
101. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 378-447; see also CURRIE, supra note 98, at 98
(suggesting that Cohens was indicative of Marshall's "general disdain for reliance on authority").
102. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 318 (1819).
103. Id. at 414.
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earlier in United States v. Fisher.10 4 But Marshall's opinion in
McCulloch made no mention of Fisher; instead he addressed the issue
as if it were one of first impression.
It would be a mistake, however, to attach too much signifi-
cance to Marshall's approach. As a general matter, the best explana-
tion for his failure to rely on precedent is probably the lack of a reli-
able digest system during the early part of the nineteenth century. In
McCulloch, for example, counsel failed to call attention to Fisher, and
Marshall's colleagues "stood by while he threw away his trump
card."0 In many cases, it may simply have been easier for Marshall
to have rehearsed his own evaluation of the merits of an issue than to
have located any appropriate case law authority.1°6
On the other hand, the lack of research resources cannot fully
explain Marshall's approach. In Cohens, after all, Marshall eventu-
ally got around to citing Martin as an afterthought to his own
analysis.107 Thus, it is tempting to conclude that Marshall's apparent
disregard for precedent was, to some extent, a natural outgrowth of
the declaratory theory and a concomitantly weak doctrine of stare
decisis. State court decisions of the founding era often adopted de-
claratory views of precedent,108 expressly stating that "a decision" is
104. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805) (rejecting the argument, in
the context of upholding Congress's power to give priority to the federal government's claims in
bankruptcy proceedings, that "[w]here various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it
might be said with respect to each, that it was not necessary because the end might be obtained
by other means").
105. CURRIE, supra note 98, at 163. Schwartz notes that in contrast to Story, who "reveled
in legal research," "Marshall disliked the labor of investigating legal authorities to support his
decisions." SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 60; see also GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY
AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 91 (1970) (attributing to Marshall the comment that
"Brother Story, here... can give us the cases from the Twelve Tables down to the latest
reports"); G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 203 (1988) (noting that "[aidvocacy
before the Marshall Court was an essentially oral medium," that "[w]ritten briefs were rare,"
and that "written treatises were neither numerous nor widely available").
106. Indeed, in contrast to his approach in the above cases, Marshall sometimes resolved
the question presented to the Court with little more than a citation of precedent. In Hampton v.
McConnell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818), for example, the Court faced the question whether a
plea of "nil debet could be a good bar" to plaintiffs action in debt. Marshall's opinion for the
Court included no independent analysis; it simply asserted that:
This is precisely the same case as that of Mills u. Duryee; the court cannot distinguish
the two cases. The doctrine there held was... that whatever pleas would be good to a
suit thereon [if the action had been brought in state court], and none others, could be
pleaded in any other court in the United States.
Id. at 235.
107. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,423 (1821).
108. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to
1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 33, 36 (1959) (asserting that in the colonial period "decided cases
were believed to contain evidence of the law," but that by the mid-nineteenth century "the
theory that cases were merely evidence of the law was under heavy attack by the theoricians").
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not law, but only prima facie evidence of the what the law is,1°9 and
that "[a] court is not bound to give the like judgment, which had been
given by a former court, unless they are of the opinion that the first
judgment was according to law.""
0
Familiarity with such an approach would naturally have led
Marshall and his colleagues to accord relatively little significance to a
prior decision. Justice Johnson championed this approach in a dis-
senting opinion in Ex parte Bollman."' Boliman presented the ques-
tion of the Supreme Court's statutory and constitutional jurisdiction
to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for
the Court upheld the Court's jurisdiction and relied, among other
things, on two prior cases in which the Court had issued the Great
Writ under similar circumstances."2 Although in the cited cases the
jurisdictional issue was neither raised by counsel nor addressed by
the Court,1 3 Marshall concluded that "the question is considered as
long since decided.""4 Johnson's dissent took a classic declaratory ap-
proach:
Uniformity in decisions is often as important as their abstract justice. But I
deny that a court is precluded from the right or exempted from the necessity of
examining into the correctness or consistency of its own decisions, or those of
any other tribunal.... Strange indeed would be the doctrine, that an inadver-
tency once committed by a court shall ever after impose on it the necessity of
persisting in its error. A case that cannot be tested by principle is not law, and
in a thousand instances have such cases been declared so by courts of
justice."
5
109. Henry v. Bank of Salina, 5 Hill 523, 535 (N.Y. 1843).
110. Kerlin's Lessee v. Bull, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 175, 178 (1786).
111. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
112. See id. (citing Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806), and United States v.
Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795)). Erich Bollman had been placed under military arrest as
an alleged accomplice of Aaron Burr in connection with Burr's purportedly treasonous
expedition to set up a separate government in the western states, and the Bollman Court was
presented with the question of its power to issue a habeas writ if it found the evidence of
treason insufficient. Public furor rose to the level of proposals in Congress to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus and to limit the Supreme Court's power to issue the writ. See 1 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 305 (1926). The Court ultimately
issued the writ in light of its conclusion that the evidence of treason was insufficient. See id. at
307.
113. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 81.
114. See Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 100. Marshall's argument directly contradicted his
earlier indication in United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805), that a mere silent
premise of an opinion, without express argument and analysis, was entitled to no deference.
See discussion infra accompanying notes 118-22.
115. Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 103-04 (Johnson, J., dissenting); cf. Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974) (suggesting that it is the Court's "prerogative" and "duty
to re-examine a precedent where its reasoning or understanding of the Constitution is fairly
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Under Johnson's declaratory approach to case law, an exami-
nation of the correctness or consistency of the Court's earlier decisions
was more than a matter of the Court's right; it was a matter of ne-
cessity. Such a reexamination of the merits flowed naturally from the
declaratory theory that "[a] case that cannot be tested by principle is
not law."116
2. Binding Precedent and the Marshall Court
Despite Marshall's penchant for reinventing the legal wheel
when settled issues reappeared, his own discussion of precedent often
contradicted the pure declaratory approach offered by Johnson. 11 The
earliest Marshall Court discussion of precedent may be found in a se-
ries of jurisdictional cases. The first was United States v. More, which
arose out of the appointment of Benjamin More to a five-year term as
justice of the peace in the District of Columbia."8 Although More
initially was entitled to a fee for his services, Congress repealed the
fee provision in 1802. More was prosecuted for continuing to accept a
fee, and he demurred on the ground that the 1802 statute con-
travened Article III's guarantee that federal judges' compensation
would not be "diminished during their continuance in office."" 9 The
More Court avoided the merits of this question by concluding that it
lacked jurisdiction to review criminal cases under the Judiciary Act.
120
In response to counsel's argument that the Court had exercised such
jurisdiction in an earlier case, Chief Justice Marshall responded that
the jurisdictional issue had not been raised, and thus that the earlier
cases had no precedential value: "It passed sub silentio, and the court
does not consider itself as bound by that case." 2'
Although the declaratory theory was alive and well in
Marshall's day, his statement in More suggests that he conceived of
prior decisions as more than evidence of the law to be easily cast aside
called into question"); 1 KENT, supra note 94, at *477 (suggesting that "there are more than one
thousand cases to be pointed out in the English and American books of reports, which have been
overruled, doubted, or limited in their application").
116. Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 104 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
117. A further contradiction may be found in Marshall's rejection of "the custom of the de-
livery of opinions by the Justices seriatim," in favor of the new practice of "announcing, himself,
the views of that tribunal." 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1800-1815,
at 16 (1919). Marshall's innovation was aimed at gaining "conclusiveness and fixity" for the new
Court's decisions, SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 39, a goal that seems inconsistent with a
"declaratory" duty of reexamination of the "reason" of precedent in every case.
118. United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805).
119. See id at 166 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. III).
120. Id. at 172-74.
12L Id. at 172.
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in favor of a more enlightened view of the proper rule. Instead, a de-
cision squarely confronting an issue apparently would have some
binding effect on the Court in subsequent cases.
122
Indeed, Marshall sought an even more expansive role for
precedent when it suited the result he favored, as the above discus-
sion of Ex parte Bollman indicates. In justifying the Court's jurisdic-
tion to issue a habeas writ, Marshall cited two prior cases in which
the Court had issued the writ. Although in the cited cases the juris-
dictional issue was neither raised by counsel nor addressed by the
Court, Marshall disregarded the distinction he had drawn in More in
concluding that "the question is considered as long since decided."
12
In apparent recognition of the inconsistency with Bollman, Marshall
acknowledged that "the question of jurisdiction was not made at the
bar," but maintained that "the case was several days under advise-
ment, and this question could not have escaped the attention of the
court."124
Marshall made a further attempt to reconcile his discordant
views on this issue in his majority opinion in United States v.
Deveaux. Deveaux was a trespass action brought by the President,
Directors, and Company of the first National Bank against certain
Georgia citizens who allegedly had taken silver from the Bank's
Savannah branch to satisfy their state tax obligations.126 The lower
court had dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; Justice Marshall's opinion
for the Court reversed. Marshall first offered a sweeping dictum:
"That invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity,
a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and, consequently,
cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United States, unless the
rights of the members, in this respect, can be exercised in their corpo-
122. Marshall's opinion in Cohens included a statement of similar effect. In the context of
distinguishing holding and dictum, Marshall asserted the following.
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be
taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go be-
yond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subse-
quent suit when the very point is presented for decision.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821). The negative implication is significant.
Marshall believed that specific conclusions that constitute the holding of the case would be
given controlling significance.
123. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 100 (1807).
124. Id.
125. United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), overruled in part by Louisville,
Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
126. Id. at 62.
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rate name."127 In other words, the National Bank could sue in diver-
sity only if its members themselves were diverse from the defendants.
Despite Marshall's broad conclusion as to the jurisdictional
status of a corporation, Deveaux did not turn on whether the Bank
itself could qualify as a citizen for diversity purposes; "no one had ar-
gued that the Bank was a citizen of any state, and it would have been
difficult to do so because it was a federal corporation."128 And there
was no dispute that the Bank's members were not citizens of Georgia,
as were the defendants. Thus, the issue presented was "whether, by
becoming members of the corporation, the individuals who compose it
lose, in their corporate affairs, those privileges which as individuals
they possessed before."129 Marshall concluded that the answer was no:
diversity jurisdiction was aimed at avoiding prejudice to outsiders,
and outsiders "are not less susceptible of these apprehen-
sions.., because they are allowed to sue by a corporate name."30
On this point, Marshall noted that the Court repeatedly had
exercised jurisdiction over "causes between a corporation and an in-
dividual without feeling a doubt respecting its jurisdiction." 3'
Apparently aware of his erratic track record on this issue (but without
citation to More or Bollman), Marshall made the following attempt at
reconciliation: "Those decisions are not cited as authority; for they
were made without considering this particular point; but they have
much weight, as they show that this point neither occurred to the bar
or the bench." 32 By way of clarification, Marshall later added that
"the precedents of this court, though they were not decisions on ar-
gument, ought not to be absolutely disregarded."133
The Marshall Court's opinions on the issue of the constitu-
tionality of state bankruptcy laws reveal a further solicitude for
precedent. The bankruptcy issue arose initially in Sturges v.
Crowninshield,'3 in which a New York bankruptcy statute was chal-
lenged as (1) inconsistent with Congress's express power under the
127. Id. at 86.
128. CURRE, supra note 98, at 88.
129. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 79.
130. Id. at 87.
131. Id. at 88.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 92. Marshall's point seems fair enough; an unspoken jurisdictional premise
should not be accorded stare decisis effect as judicial authority on that point, but neither should
it be disregarded altogether-it may be given some weight in showing that the Court and coun-
sel failed to raise the issue. But it should be recognized that this approach retracts much of
Marshall's conclusion in Boliman that a jurisdictional question may be "considered as long since
decided" by the mere exercise ofjurisdiction.
134. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
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Constitution to establish bankruptcy laws; and (2) an impairment of
the obligation of contracts. Marshall's opinion for the Court ruled
that Congress's bankruptcy power was not exclusive, "provided there
be no act of Congress in force to establish a uniform system of bank-
ruptcy," 135 but that the New York statute violated the Contracts
Clause insofar as it applied retroactively to contracts in place prior to
enactment of the New York law.136 Eight years later, in Ogden v.
Saunders,3 7 the question of the constitutionality of prospec-
tive application of state bankruptcy provisions came before the Court.
The seriatim opinions in Ogden upheld state authority to enact pro-
spective bankruptcy statutes, offering competing theories on the sub-
stantive issues before the Court but a surprising consensus as to the
precedential value of Sturges.
Justice Washington voted with the majority, based primarily
on his conclusion that the Contracts Clause protected only the
"obligation" of contracts, not the contracts themselves, and thus was
offended only by retroactive legislation, which was "oppressive, un-
just, and tyrannical."3 8 Before reaching this question, however,
Washington first paused to emphasize his deference to Sturges.
Apparently, Justice Washington's initial inclination would have been
to strike down the bankruptcy statute in Ogden on the broad ground
that Congress's bankruptcy power was exclusive. But he expressly
declined to take that route in light of the Sturges Court's rejection of
that argument:
To the decision of this Court, made in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, and
to the reasoning of the learned Judge who delivered that opinion, I entirely
submit; although I did not then, nor can I now bring my mind to concur in that
part of it which admits the constitutional power of the State legislatures to
pass bankrupt laws, by which I understand, those laws which discharge the
person and the future acquisitions of the bankrupt from his debts. I have al-
ways thought that the power to pass such a law was exclusively vested by the
constitution in the legislature of the United States. But it becomes me to be-
135. Id. at 208.
136. See id. at 207-08.
137. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
138. Id. at 266 (Washington, J.). Although the Ogden Court generally upheld the states'
power to pass prospective bankruptcy legislation, it did not relieve the debtor in question from
his obligation, since the Court held that the states had no power to affect contracts made by citi-
zens of other states. Id. at 359 (Johnson, J., concurring); see also 2 WARREN, supra note 112, at
692 (suggesting that "the financial troubles which arose, during the next ten years, out of the
over-speculation in public lands, canals and railroads, and out of disastrous banking methods,
could have been alleviated by the exercise of Congressional power in the passage of a National
Bankruptcy Act, when they could not be adequately dealt with by the insolvent laws of the sepa-
rate States" under the ruling in Ogden).
1999] 673
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:647
lieve that this opinion was, and is incorrect, since it stands condemned by the
decision of a majority of this Court, solemnly pronounced.
139
Justice Washington's apparent disagreement with Sturges on the ex-
clusivity of Congress's bankruptcy power was insufficient to justify
abandoning it. If forced to choose between his own view and that
adopted by a majority of the Court, Washington opted for the latter,
rejecting his own views as incorrect by definition even though he
clearly had not changed his private views on the matter. Since
Sturges had not resolved the question whether the Contracts Clause
was offended by purely prospective application of a state bankruptcy
law, however, Washington proceeded to analyze that issue unencum-
bered by any prior authority.
Chief Justice Marshall dissented,140 concluding that the
Contracts Clause was equally offended by prospective or retrospective
bankruptcy legislation, but offered dicta that indicated his agreement
as to the precedential value of Sturges. "In Sturges v. Crowninshield,"
Marshall explained, "it was determined, that an act which discharged
the debtor from a contract entered into previous to its passage, was
repugnant to the constitution." 4' The Contracts Clause question be-
fore the Court in Ogden was different from that decided in Sturges,
139. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 263-64. Professor Currie lauds Washington's
"admirable self-restraint" in "respecting the precedential effect of what was really only a dictum
in Sturges," and in thus "castling] the deciding vote to uphold a law he believed invalid."
CURRIE, supra note 98, at 151. Professor White similarly notes Washington's "blend of
stubbornness and deference to precedent," but also suggests that the Justices in Ogden "tacitly
agreed not to give... any weight" to Sturges' companion case of McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 209 (1819). WHITE, supra note 105, at 651-52. White's analysis assigns an overbroad
holding to McMillan. As White asserts, McMillan's rejection of the state bankruptcy law in that
case included an assertion by the Chief Justice that it was immaterial whether the law had been
"passed before the debt was contracted." McMillan, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 213. But this
conclusion was pure dicta; the statute's application in McMillan was effectively retrospective in
that the contract at issue had been "made in a different State, by persons residing in that State,
and, consequently, without any view to" the bankruptcy law in question. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) at 333 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). Prior to Ogden, the Court had not directly
addressed the constitutionality of a purely prospective application of a state insolvency law, and
Marshall's rejection of the prospective/retrospective distinction in McMillan was dicta. As
Marshall himself conceded in Ogden, McMillan was not controlling in view of the "general rule"
that "the positive authority of a decision is co-extensive only with the facts on which it is made."
Id. Thus, the Justices' conclusion in Ogden that the constitutionality of prospective bankruptcy
legislation was "open for discussion" despite McMillan merely indicates their refusal to assign
precedential weight to dicta, and does not support White's conclusion that the Marshall Court
"tacitly agreed" to ignore the proper effect of a holding.
140. See Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 332 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). Professor Currie
notes that "Ogden was the only constitutional case in thirty-four years in which Marshall signed
a dissent." CURRIE, supra note 98, at 151.
141. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 333 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
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however, and thus Marshall concluded that the issue was not con-
trolled by Sturges:
[Ilt is a general rule, expressly recognized by the Court in Sturges v.
Crowninshield, that the positive authority of a decision is co-extensive only
with the facts on which it is made. In Sturges v. Crowninshield, the law acted
on a contract which was made before its passage; in this case, the contract was
entered into after the passage of the law.
42
In the absence of any decision with positive authority on the point in
question, Marshall agreed that it was "consequently, open for discus-
sion."143 Despite his disagreement with the result in Ogden, Marshall
offered the converse of this point when the question arose again in
Boyle v. Zacharie, resolving that the principles established by the
majority in Ogden "are to be considered no longer open for contro-
versy, but the settled law of the court."14
Taken together, the above cases evidence the view that an ac-
tual holding in an earlier case has "binding" effect and "controls the
judgment" in a subsequent suit. The Marshall Court apparently had
moved beyond the pure declaratory approach advocated by Johnson,
which would invite de novo reexamination of the merits of a prior de-
cision in every case.
3. Overruling Decisions and the Marshall Court
But Marshall's statements must be understood in context.
General dicta about the importance of adherence to precedent-either
in cases in which the Court abides by a former decision or where the
Court has not directly confronted the issue at hand-may provide a
jaundiced view of the actual state of the doctrine. Marshall's reliance
on precedent in support of a certain result may merely have turned on
a conclusion that the prior decision was correctly decided,145 or on the
view that "[i]t could subserve no useful purpose again to examine the
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 348, 348 (1832). Marshall's deference to precedent
even extended, to some degree, to English decisions. See Cathcart v. Robinson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
264, 280 (1831) (concluding that English decisions under the "statute of Elizabeth," which had
been adopted in the United States, could "properly be considered as accompanying the statutes
themselves, and forming an integral part of them," where such decisions preceded the adoption
of the statute in the United States, but that subsequent decisions were entitled only to "great
respect," and were not "absolute authority").
145. See United States ex reL Amy v. Mayor of Burlington, 154 U.S. 568, 569 (1870) (noting
that the case is "substantially the same" as Butz v. City of Muscatine, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 575
(1869), and indicating that "[o]ur opinion is the same as in that case").
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subject."14 Moreover, even if Marshall's statements about deference
to precedent are taken at face value, they leave unanswered the
question of the extent of the binding effect of the earlier decision and
the circumstances under which a subsequent court might avoid such
an effect. The answer to this question may be found by turning to an
examination of the cases in which the Marshall Court actually over-
ruled its prior decisions.
Three Marshall Court decisions are generally identified in
statistical studies as overruling past precedent:147 Hudson v. Guestier
(Hudson II),14 Gordon v. Ogden,49 and Green v. Neal's Lessee.150 The
dispute in Hudson H involved competing claims to the cargo of the
vessel Sea Flower, which had been captured by the French while the
ship was trading, in violation of French ordinances, with certain parts
of the island of Hispaniola that were in revolt.15 The issue before the
Court was whether a French tribunal had jurisdiction to issue a
judgment of condemnation in favor of the captors of the vessel. This
question turned on two distinct sub-issues: (1) whether the
circumstances of the captors' seizure of the vessel deprived the French
court of jurisdiction; and (2) whether the French court's jurisdiction
required the presence of the vessel in a French port. When the
jurisdictional issue in Hudson H had been previously presented to the
Court with the companion case of Rose v. Himely,52 Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion focused on the first sub-issue, and concluded that
the seizure had been made "on the high seas," or more than "two
leagues from the coast"'53-and that such an invalid seizure deprived
the French court ofjurisdiction.' M
The Court's decision in Hudson II rejected Marshall's conclu-
sion on this issue. Justice Livingston's opinion in Hudson II
(concurred in by all Justices but Marshall) held that it was not mate-
rial whether the vessel was "taken on the high seas, or more than two
146. Wright v. Sill, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 544,545 (1862).
147. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 2245-46 (1996); see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 n.1 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Albert P. Blaustein & Andrew
H. Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L. REV. 151, 159-60 (1958).
148. Hudson v. Guestier (Hudson ID, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810).
149. Gordon v. Ogden, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 33 (1830).
150. Green v. Neal's Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832).
151. After its capture, the Sea Flower was taken to the Spanish port of Baracoa. The
French captors then sought and received a judgment of "condemnation" from "a French tribunal
at Guadaloupe," and the cargo was sold for the benefit of the captors and purchased by Guestier.
Hudson II, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 281.
152. Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
153. Id. at 273-74.
154. See id. at 279.
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leagues from the coast."155 "By a seizure on the high seas," Livingston
said, France had "interfered with the jurisdiction of no other nation,
the authority of each being there concurrent."
56
In this context, Hudson H is understandably characterized as
overruling Rose. Marshall's opinion in Rose is styled by the reporter
as "the opinion of the court,"5 7 and his conclusion regarding the pro-
priety of the seizure included his own assertion that "[t]o a majority of
the court it seems to follow, that such a seizure is totally invalid," and
"that such possession confers no jurisdiction on the court of the coun-
try to which the captor belongs." 58 Moreover, in Hudson II Marshall
concluded his brief dissent with the assertion that "the principle of
that case (Rose v. Himely) is now overruled."159 Beyond this acknowl-
edgment, the Court in Hudson II offered no explanation for its appar-
ent rejection of Rose. Understandably, the Hudson II Court's
seemingly cavalier treatment of precedent has been thought to betray
the Marshall Court's purported commitment to stare decisis.
60
But the apparent betrayal is illusory. In fact, the holding in
Hudson II addresses an issue that had been expressly reserved in
Rose. Despite Marshall's characterization of his opinion in Rose as
the majority, in Hudson H he admitted to an error in counting votes
in Rose.'
61
Marshall's counting error is evident from an examination of
the other opinions in Rose. Six Justices participated in the case, five
of whose votes are accounted for in the report of the case. Justices
Livingston, Cushing, and Chase concurred in the judgment, but they
expressly declined to render "an opinion on the invalidity of a seizure
on the high seas." 62 Livingston's concurrence sidestepped the validity
of the seizure by concluding that the French court lacked jurisdiction
155. Hudson II, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 284.
156. Id.
157. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 268.
158. Id. at 279.
159. Hudson II, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 285 (emphasis added).
160. See Monaghan, supra note 2, at 757 & n.186 (citing Guestier for the proposition that
"[t~he view that a judicial precedent is the equivalent of a legislative act has never existed in
American law").
161. Marshall discusses his error in Rose in his brief dissent in Hudson II, which is
reported in relevant part as follows:
"Marshall, Ch. J. observed, that he had supposed that the former opinion delivered in
these cases upon this point had been concurred in by four judges. But in this he was
mistaken." The opinion was concurred in by one judge. He was still of opinion that the
construction then given was correct.
Hudson II, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 285 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (citing Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
at 268 (Marshall, C.J., delivering opinion of the Court)).
162. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 281 (Livingston, J., concurring).
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"because The Sarah and her cargo were condemned by a French tri-
bunal sitting at St. Domingo, without having been carried into that,
or any other French port."163 Justice Johnson dissented and disagreed
with Marshall's majority approach. In Johnson's view, the Court was
"not at liberty" to inquire into the propriety of the seizure, and in any
event the seizure arguably was consistent with the "law of nations."
164
Thus, four Justices in Rose were on record as either declining
to reach the propriety of the seizure or overtly disagreeing with
Marshall's conclusions on that issue. Although his vote was not re-
ported, Justice Washington apparently was the sole vote in support of
Marshall's opinion. In this light, Hudson II cannot be read to overrule
any proper holding of the Court, and the case should not be read as
evidence of a permissive, declaratory approach to precedent.
Marshall's conclusion that the principle of Rose had been overruled
was perhaps his way of saving face over his counting error, but in fact
the principle at issue was a minority view and not a holding.
Green v. Neal's Lessee 65 is similarly misplaced in lists of
Marshall Court overruling decisions. To be sure, the Neal's Lessee
Court did set aside Patton's Lessee v. Easton 66 and Powell's Lessee v.
Green,6 7 which had concluded that under Tennessee case law, a
seven-year Tennessee statute of limitations required a claimant in
adverse possession to establish that his possession was accompanied
by "a connected title, either legal or equitable."68  Neal's Lessee
abandoned that requirement and held that a showing of connected
title was not required.
69
But the decision in Neal's Lessee did not raise the stare decisis
question of the effect of a determination that Patton's Lessee and
Powell's Lessee were incorrectly decided in the first instance. Instead,
the issue in Neal's Lessee was the binding effect of subsequent
developments in Tennessee case law. Neal's Lessee is not a stare
decisis case; it merely held that the Court had the duty to adopt the
evolving local law of Tennessee on this statute of limitations
question. 70
163. Id.
164. Id. at 287-89 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
165. Green v. Neal's Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832).
166. Patton's Lessee v. Easton, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 476 (1816).
167. Powell's Lessee v. Green, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 241 (1829).
168. Neal's Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 295.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 298 (noting that "where a question arises under local law," the decision by a
state court of last resort "should be considered as final by this court").
678 [Vol. 52:647
STARE DECISIS
Gordon v. Ogden, by contrast, was a true overruling decision,
and its treatment of precedent provides an opportunity to examine the
extent of the Marshall Court's commitment to a binding rule of stare
decisis and of any exceptions to the rule. The issue in Gordon was
whether the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over cases in which the
matter in dispute exceeds $2000 should be measured by the amount
claimed in the pleadings or by the actual amount of the judgment.171
The Court's earlier decision in Wilson v. Danie 72 had adopted the
former measure: "To ascertain... the matter in dispute," Wilson had
held that the Court "must recur to the foundation of the original con-
troversy-to the matter in [dispute] when the action was instituted,"
and not to "the sum, or value, found by a verdict."'173 Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion for the Court in Gordon expressly overruled the
Wilson standard, but not without first indicating a reluctance to do so:
Although that case was decided by a divided court, and although we think, that
upon the true construction of the twenty-second section of the judicial act, the
jurisdiction of the court depends upon the sum in dispute between the parties
as the case stands upon the writ of error, we should be much inclined to adhere
to the decision in Wilson vs. Daniel, had not a contrary practice since pre-
vailed. 174
For Marshall, the mere conclusion that Wilson wrongly inter-
preted the statute was insufficient to justify overruling it. Marshall
did not use the modern buzz words of "special justification," but his
analysis was substantially in accord with the view that such a justifi-
cation was necessary. In this instance, the Court's inclination to fol-
low precedent despite its purported error was overcome by the con-
trary practice that had prevailed since that decision was announced. 175
The contrary practice referred to by Marshall was evidenced by
the Court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of Wise & Lynn v.
Columbian Turnpike Co.176 In that case, plaintiffs Wise & Lynn as-
171. Gordon v. Ogden, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 33, 34(1830).
172. Wilson v. Daniel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 401 (1798), overruled by Gordon v. Ogden, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 33 (1830).
173. Id. at 405.
174. Gordon, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 34.
175. See id.
176. Wise & Lynn v. Columbian Turnpike Co., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 276, 276 (1812).
Marshall also quoted a dictum from Cooke v. Woodrow, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 13, 14 (1809), that "[if
the judgment below be for the plaintiff, that judgment ascertains the value of the matter in dis-
pute." Gordon, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 35. But, as Marshall himself acknowledged, Cooke provided
little support for a practice "contrary" to the standard announced in Wilson since the dictum
"was said in a case in which the defendant below was a plaintiff in error, and in which the
judgment was a sufficient sum to give jurisdiction." Id. In that context, a judgment in excess of
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serted a claim against the defendant in the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia for a sum in excess of $100. The court entered a
judgment ii favor of Wise & Lynn in the amount of $45. Wise & Lynn
sought a writ of error from the Supreme Court, whose jurisdiction
over cases from the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
required that the amount in controversy exceed $100. Without any
citation to Wilson, or any attempt to distinguish the $100 amount-in-
controversy requirement from the $2000 requirement in Wilson, the
Wise & Lynn Court dismissed the writ of error on grounds that con-
flicted directly with the line drawn in Wilson.177
Although most statistical studies designate only the above
three overruling decisions in the Marshall era, there is at least one
more case that should be added to the list. In United States v.
Percheman,178 Chief Justice Marshall authored an opinion for the
Court that expressly set aside the interpretation given to a treaty
with Spain just four years earlier in Foster v. Neilson.179 In both
Foster and Percheman, plaintiffs had asserted claims to certain par-
cels of land within the Louisiana territory under grants from the
Spanish crown. Although the grants in question post-dated the treaty
of St. Ildefonso, by which Spain had ceded the Louisiana territory to
France, a subsequent treaty between the United States and Spain
ratified those grants. s0 The primary question before the Court in
Foster and Percheman was whether this language was self-executing,
or whether it was contract language that would require a further leg-
islative act of ratification.1s'
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Foster adopted the former
view. 82 He relied principally on the common-sense meaning of the
language, noting that the treaty "does not say that those grants are
hereby confirmed," but that "those grants shall be ratified and con-
firmed to the persons in possession," which "seems to be the language
of contract." 83 Four years later, Marshall's opinion in Percheman
$2000 could easily be said to satisfy the jurisdictional amount without implying the converse
that a judgment for less than that amount would defeat jurisdiction.
177. The report of Wise & Lynn simply indicates as follows: "Upon the return of the rule, it
appearing that the sum awarded was only 45 dollars, the Court, all the Judges being present,
decided that they had no jurisdiction, although the sum claimed by Wise & Lynn... was more
than 100 dollars." Wise & Lynn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 276.
178. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 52-53 (1833).
179. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 316 (1829), overruled in part by Percheman, 32
U.S. (7. Pet.) at 51.
180. See Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 89.





reached the opposite conclusion and expressly disavowed Foster on
this point. But Marshall's about-face did not turn merely on a
changed view of the merits.
Instead, Marshall's Percheman decision turned on his conclu-
sion that an important piece of the factual record was not before the
Court in Foster. Specifically, Marshall noted that the treaty in ques-
tion had been drafted in both Spanish and English, and that settled
law required a construction of the treaty that allows both versions to
agree.'5 ' The Spanish version of the treaty provided that the grants in
question "shall remain ratified and confirmed to the persons in pos-
session of them, to the same extent."185 Although Marshall reaffirmed
that the English version seemed to use the "words of contract," he also
acknowledged that "they are not necessarily so," and that "[t]hey may
import that they 'shall be ratified and confirmed,' by force of the in-
strument itself."'6 In setting aside Foster's construction of the treaty,
Marshall speculated that the result would have been the same if the
Spanish version had been before the Court.87
Thus, the Marshall Court's true overruling decisions (Gordon
and Percheman) recognized limited exceptions to the rule of binding
precedent articulated in the Court's overruling rhetoric rehearsed
above. Gordon found a justification for overturning a prior decision in
the contrary practice that had developed in the Court's subsequent
cases; Percheman relied on the conclusion that important facts were
not before the Court in its earlier, erroneous decision.
C. Error Correction in Historical Perspective
As the above discussion demonstrates, the modern doctrinal
tension over the stare decisis effect of a currently perceived error was
also evident in the founding era. In one sense, the notion of analytical
error as a special justification for overturning precedent has the deep-
est of historical roots. Blackstone's rule of stare decisis acknowledged
184. See Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 88.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 89.
187. See id. Marshall wrote:
In the case of Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, this court considered these words as im-
porting contract. The Spanish part of the treaty was not then brought to our view, and
we then supposed, that there was no variance between them. We did not suppose that
there was even a formal difference of expression in the same instrument, drawn up in
the language of each party. Had this circumstance been known, we believe it would
have produced the construction which we now give to the article.
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a single exception, one that permitted departure from precedent
deemed clearly contrary to reason, and vestiges of the declaratory ap-
proach were evident in the Court's early treatment of precedent.18
But it would be a mistake to conclude that the founding gen-
eration embraced an open invitation to reexamine the merits of any
prior decision. Blackstone's conception of stare decisis acknowledged
the rule-swallowing effect of a merits-based exception and accordingly
sought to circumscribe the scope of the exception. Blackstone himself
noted the policy of assuring that the common law is not altered ac-
cording to a subsequent judge's "private sentiments: he being sworn
to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but
according to the known laws and customs of the land."189 Unless the
reexamination of the reason and justice of the earlier decision is
properly cabined, the result warned of by Blackstone would easily
arise: The common law would depend on private sentiments and not
on the "customs of the land."
The framing generation understood the danger inherent in the
declaratory theory of case law. The notion that "nothing is law that is
not reason," Sir William Jones noted, is:
[11n theory, excellent; but in practice, dangerous, as many rules, true in the ab-
stract, are false in the concrete. For, since the reason of Titius may, and fre-
quently does, differ from the reason of Septimius, no man, who is not a lawyer,
would ever know how to act, and no man who is a lawyer, would in many
instances know what to advise, unless courts were bound by authority, as
firmly as the pagan deities were supposed to be bound by the decrees of fate. 9°
As Jones, Scalia, and even Blackstone would tell us, a coherent doc-
trine of precedent cannot invite a de novo reexamination of whether
the legal analysis in a prior decision conforms to the current judge's
view of the proper approach to the problem. Such a doctrine "would
be no doctrine at all" in the sense that it would accord exclusive sig-
nificance to the policy of accuracy while completely ignoring the poli-
cies of stability and institutional integrity.
188. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 72, at *69.
189. Id.
190. WILnmn JONES, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 84 (Boston, Etheridge for West
1796); see also 1 CHARLES FEARNE, AN ESSAY ON THE LEARNING OF CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
AND EXECUTORY DEVISES 170 (London ed. 1844):
If rules and maxims of law were to ebb and flow with the taste of the judge, or to assume
that shape which in his fancy best becomes the times; if the decision of one case were
not to be ruled by or depend at all upon former determinations in other cases of a like
nature; I should be glad to know, what person would venture to purchase an estate,
without first having the judgment of a court of justice, respecting the identical title
under which he means to purchase?
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Thus, the founding generation apparently rejected the permis-
sive error-correction standards sometimes offered by the modern
Court. The notion of a "duty to reexamine a precedent where its rea-
soning or understanding of the Constitution is fairly called into ques-
tion,"191 though consistent with the declaratory theory and espoused in
some founding-era opinions, likely would have been rejected as evis-
cerating the doctrine of stare decisis. But the founding generation
also rejected the opposite extreme, which would have foreclosed error
correction altogether as a basis for overruling precedent. Instead, the
Blackstone standard of precedent charted a compromise course that
attempted to avoid the rule-swallowing effect of a merits-based ex-
ception by narrowly limiting the availability of correction for error.
The founding-era compromise seems comparable to the modern
notion that only an egregious error justifies abandoning precedent.192
Blackstone conceded that the "particular reason of every rule in the
law" cannot "at this distance of time be always precisely assigned."193
But in Blackstone's view, even the lack of a currently perceived rea-
son to support a decision was insufficient to justify rejecting it: "[I]t is
sufficient that there be nothing in the rule flatly contradictory to rea-
son, and then the law will presume it to be well founded."'9 Thus, far
from inviting a de novo reevaluation of the reason behind a particular
common law decision, Blackstone placed a weighty thumb on the scale
in favor of the previous decision, with any doubts being resolved in
favor of staying the course.
Modern application of Blackstone's notion of error correction
also requires an appreciation of the significant difference in the na-
ture of the judicial work-product in the two eras. Today the business
of the Supreme Court is largely "the interpretation of public enact-
ments which are in themselves laws binding on all whom they con-
cern," while the great proportion of the case law from Blackstone's era
"does not profess to interpret any written law, whether original or
derivative, but professes on the contrary to develop and apply princi-
ples that have never been committed to any authentic form of
words."195 In the common law context of divining the best applicable
191. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
192. See supra note 44.
193. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 72, at *70.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 239 (London, MacMillani &
Co., 1896); see also Scalia, supra note 8, at 84-88 (contrasting the work of common-law judges,
whose role it is to have "the intelligence to know what is the best rule of law to govern the case
at hand," with that of modern federal appellate courts, which are involved exclusively in the
"interpretation of text-the text of a regulation, or of a statute, or of the Constitution").
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rule without any controlling legal text, Blackstone acknowledged that
a judge could reject a former decision as "manifestly absurd or unjust"
where the decision lacked any foundation in equity or fairness.196 But
that standard is not logically transferrable to the business of the
modern Supreme Court. The "interpretation of public enactments
which are in themselves laws binding on all whom they concern" 19
does not naturally lend itself to the substitution of a Justice's views of
equity or fairness for the settled meaning of the controlling text.
Thus, Justice Stevens' notion of a stare decisis standard that permits
the modem Court to evaluate a precedents consistency with the cur-
rent sense of justice, the social welfare, or the mores of the day 98 finds
some historical roots in the context of common law precedent; but it is
not logically applicable to the predominant business of the modem
Court of interpreting binding legal text.
Madison's conception of stare decisis is a more natural fit for
the judicial business of the modem Court. He maintained that a de-
cision arguably expounding or interpreting the law or the
Constitution was worthy of deference, but believed that deference
ended once the decision reached the level of altering or repealing the
law.199 Like Blackstone, Madison conceived of a strong presumption
in favor of the merits of a judicial decision, so much so that any
decision even arguably expounding or interpreting the text was
worthy of deference.20°
The Marshall Court's opinions reinforce this hesitation to over-
turn precedent on the basis of mere error. Its opinions repeatedly ad-
verted to the binding or controlling effect of precedent, and its true
overruling decisions appeared to conclude that something more than
mere error was required to justify a change of course. The basis for
error correction in those cases overlaps substantially with the notions
often expressed by the modem Court that precedent may be suscep-
tible to reversal if it is undermined (though not expressly overruled)
by subsequent cases, 20' or if it is premised on an incomplete factual
record.202
196. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 72, at 70.
197. POLLOCK, supra note 195, at 239.
198. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190-91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
199. See Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 92, at 477.
200. See Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831) reprinted in
MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 87, at 391.
201 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-38 (1997); see also infra text accompanying
notes 374-79. The modern Court has also suggested that the precedential value of a decision
diminishes when the decision is inconsistent with prior authority. See Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
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The Marshall Court's decisions also devoted substantial atten-
tion to the question recently before the Court in Hohn v. United States
as to whether the Court's mere practice of exercising jurisdiction has
any precedential significance.203 In upholding the Court's jurisdiction
to review denials of applications for certificates of appealability under
its certiorari jurisdiction (and overruling House v. Mayo204 on that
point), the Hohn majority concluded that House had been undermined
by the Court's subsequent practice of exercising certiorari jurisdiction
under circumstances precluded by House.205 Justice Scalia's dissent
chided the majority for its attempt to stretch the notion of under-
mined authority. Scalia noted that the decisions cited by the majority
"not only fail to mention House; they fail to mention the jurisdictional
issue to which House pertains," and complained that the Court had
"repeatedly held that the existence of unaddressed jurisdictional de-
fects has no precedential effect."206  In response, the Hohn majority
apologetically cited Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in More on this
point, conceding that "opinions passing on jurisdictional issues sub
(1990), principally on the ground that that case was inconsistent "with a prior doctrine more
embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience"); Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 835 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the precedential value of Booth v.
Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers was diminished because they had "announce[d] a novel
rule, contrary to long and unchallenged practice"). Although this analysis is not evident in the
Marshall Court's opinions, it does seem traceable to principles accepted by English courts and
commentators of the founding era. See JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, FIrST BOOK OF THE LAw § 98, at
77 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868) (suggesting that a case may be overruled if it is not in ac-
cordance with "the principles which constitute the pre-existing law, or especially if it is in con-
flict with them"); 1 KENT, supra note 94, at *478 (noting that "[Lord Mansfield's] successor, Lord
Kenyon ... controlled or overruled several very important decisions of Lord Mansfield, as
dangerous innovations, and on the ground that they had departed from the precedents of former
times, and disturbed the landmarks of property, and had unauthorizedly superadded equity
powers to a court of law").
202. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1990) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ., plurality opinion) (suggesting that a reversal of course in precedent may be called
for where the overruling decision "rest[s] on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed from
those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions");
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 410-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that stare decisis is weakened in cases where the decision "is dependent upon the
determination ofwhat in legal parlance is called a fact").
203. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 118 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (1998) (holding that it is
unnecessary to "invoke[ I extraordinary jurisdiction in routine cases").
204. House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42,44 (1945), overruled by Hohn, 118 S. Ct. at 1969.
205. Hohn, 118 S. Ct. at 1977-78. The Hohn majority nevertheless sought some refuge in
the practice: "Once we have decided to reconsider a particular rule, however, we would be
remiss if we did not consider the consistency with which it has been applied in practice." Id. at
1978.
206. Id. at 1982 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2
(1996)).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
silentio" are not deemed to have "overruled an opinion addressing the
issue directly."
20 7
If it had probed deeper into Marshall's treatment of this issue,
the Hohn majority might have found some response for Justice
Scalia's criticism of its purportedly "new approach to unaddressed ju-
risdictional defects."208 After all, like the majority in Hohn, Marshall
had a difficult time completely ignoring the Court's assumptions of
jurisdiction when it furthered the result he wished to reach. Despite
his statement in More, Marshall's conclusion in Ex parte Bollman that
the Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus turned sub-
stantially on the fact that the Court had issued the writ in two prior
cases. And in United States v. Deveaux, 2 9 Marshall sought to support
his conclusion that individuals do not lose their right to sue in diver-
sity by doing business as a corporation by noting that the Court re-
peatedly had exercised jurisdiction over "causes between a corporation
and an individual without feeling a doubt respecting its jurisdic-
tion."21o
Marshall wanted to have it both ways. He was stuck with his
earlier statement that an unspoken jurisdictional premise should not
be accorded stare decisis effect as judicial authority on that point. But
where such a premise helped him, Marshall adopted the view that it
could be given some weight in showing that the Court and counsel
failed to raise the issue.211 In this light, Justice Scalia's dissenting
objection in Hohn as to the novelty of the majority's treatment of
"unaddressed jurisdictional defects" arguably misses the mark. The
Hohn Court's inconsistency may well have been logically untenable,
but the contradiction was hardly novel.
Indeed, if one overarching conclusion is to be made about the
doctrine of precedent in the founding era and the Marshall Court, it
would be that the stare decisis principles of that day were plagued by
the same doctrinal tensions and conflicts that are present in the
Rehnquist Court's opinions. Considerations of stability and institu-
tional integrity place a high premium on consistency with past deci-
sions, while a countervailing concern for accuracy calls for some
mechanism for error correction. Blackstone's conception of stare
207. Id. at 1978.
208. Id. at 1982 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
210. Id. at 88.
211. But see Hohn, 118 S. Ct. at 1978 (acknowledging that "opinions passing on jurisdic-
tional issues sub silentio" are not to be read as overruling an earlier holding, but insisting that




decisis sought to resolve this tension with a strong presumption in
favor of precedent and a limited notion of error correction.212 The
Marshall Court's opinions generally reinforced that approach, and in-
troduced a consideration that has often played a role in the modern
Court: that precedent undermined by subsequent decisions may be
peculiarly susceptible to reversal.
213
IV. RULES OF PROPERTY AND RELIANCE INTERESTS
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Payne v.
Tennessee2 4 relied extensively on the notion of a sliding stare decisis
scale on commercial reliance grounds. In abandoning the previously
held view that the Eighth Amendment precluded victim-impact evi-
dence in capital cases, Rehnquist asserted that "[clonsiderations in
favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and
contract rights, where reliance interests are involved."215 Because the
question in Payne "involv[ed] procedural and evidentiary rules,"
Rehnquist concluded that considerations in favor of stare decisis were
at a minimum, and error correction was more freely available.216
Justice Marshall's dissent objected to the majority's approach,
accusing the Chief of "r]enouncing this Court's historical commitment
to a conception of 'the judiciary as a source of impersonal and rea-
soned judgments.' "217 In Marshall's view, a standard that limits "full
protection of the doctrine of stare decisis to 'cases involving property
and contract rights'.., sends a clear signal that essentially all deci-
sions implementing the personal liberties protected by the Bill of
212. See supra Part IlIIA.
213. As noted in detail in Part IV below, the doctrinal tension on the basic question of the
Court's capacity for error correction continued in the Taney era. Taney Court opinions often
equivocated about whether the perception of an error was a sufficient consideration to justify
abandoning precedent. But in the Taney era, the Court also introduced an additional consid-
eration that explains the apparent inconsistencies in its overruling rhetoric. See infra discus-
sion at notes 235-94.
214. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
215. Id. at 828.
216. A similar approach carried the day in United States u. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521
(1995), in which the Court overruled Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) in holding
that the element of "materiality" was a matter of fact to be decided by the jury, and not a matter
of law to be resolved by the court. The Gaudin Court held that the "role" of stare decisis was
"somewhat reduced.., in the case of a procedural rule such as this, which does not serve as a
guide to lawful behavior." Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521.
217. Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)).
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Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are open to reexamination."218
Such an "impoverished conception of stare decisis," according to
Marshall, "cannot possibly be reconciled with the values that inform
the proper judicial function," since "stare decisis is important not
merely because individuals rely on precedent to structure their com-
mercial activity but because fidelity to precedent is part and parcel of
a conception of 'the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned
judgments.' "219
At least one commentator has taken Justice Marshall's side in
the above debate, attacking the reliance standard as a "modern meth-
odology in the service of judicial legislation."20 Under this view, "the
common law method, as adopted by the Framers' generation and
rooted in Article III," is seen as "emphasiz[ing] Blackstonian prece-
dent in all cases, not primarily for commercial predictability, but as
the principal bulwark against usurpation of the rule of law by judicial
tyranny."21
A. Rules of Property in the Founding Era
History provides ample support for Chief Justice Rehnquist's
side of the Payne debate. Blackstone's explication of error correction
drew no express distinction between commercial cases and other de-
cisions, but the distinction had already taken hold in the English
courts. One early English statement appeared in Morecock v. Dickins,
a 1768 case in the High Court of Chancery.222 The issue in that case
was whether Dickins, the holder of a legal mortgage on property,
should be considered to have received constructive notice of a prior
equitable mortgage held by Morecock, by virtue of Morecock's regis-
tration of the deed. 22 Counsel for Morecock argued that registration
should serve as constructive notice.224 Although Lord Camden indi-
cated his inclination to agree with this argument on its merits, he re-
fused to abandon settled precedent on the point:
If this was a new point, it might admit of difficulty; but the determination in
Bedford v. Bacchus seems to have settled it, and it would be mischievous to
218. Id. at 851 (quoting South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 828 (1989) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)).
219. Id. at 852 (quoting Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403).
220. William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19 VT.
L. REV. 5, 18 (1994).
221. Id.
222. Morecock v. Dickins, 27 Eng. Rep. 440 (Ch. 1768).
223. See id. at 440.
224. See id. at 441.
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disturb it.... Much property has been settled, and conveyances have pro-
ceeded upon the ground of that determination.... A thousand neglects to
search have been occasioned by that determination, and therefore I cannot
take upon me to alter it. If this was a new case, I should have my doubts; but
the point is closed by that determination, which has been acquiesced in ever
since.
225
The commercial reliance interests in Morecock were unmistakable. "A
thousand neglects to search" the registries had been premised on the
proposition that registration of an equitable mortgage was not con-
structive notice to a legal mortgagee, and thus Lord Camden pre-
served the precedent despite his doubts about its merits.226
The converse position was also recognized in the English
courts of the founding era. In Robinson v. Bland, the court deter-
mined, among other things, to abandon the general rule limiting a
prevailing plaintiff in a breach of contract suit to interest accruing to
"the day that the writ is sued out."227 The general rule was abandoned
as certainly unreasonable, and replaced with a new standard award-
ing interest accruing "down to the time of the last act done by the
Court, to liquidate the demand."228 Judge Wilmot's opinion offered a
reliance-based justification for the court's correction of this error:
Where an error is established and has taken root, upon which any rule of prop-
erty depends, it ought to be adhered to by the Judges, till the Legislature
thinks proper to alter it: lest the new determination should have a retrospect,
and shake many questions already settled: but the reforming erroneous points
225. Id.
226. Id. Similarly, in Hodgson v. Ambrose, 99 Eng. Rep. 216, 219 (KB. 1780), Mansfield
stated:
With regard to the question, whether the interposition of trustees to preserve contingent
remainders, shall vary the rule of law.., whatever our opinion might be upon principle
and authorities, if the point were new, we all think, that, since this is literally the same
case with Coulson v. Coulson, and that has stood as law for so many years, it ought not
now to be litigated again. It would answer no good purpose, and might produce
mischief. The great object, in questions of property, is certainty, and if an erroneous or
hasty determination has got into practice, there is more benefit derived from adhering to
it, than if it were to be overturned.
Id.; see also Doe v. Manning, 103 Eng. Rep. 495, 500 (KB. 1807):
Much property has, no doubt, been purchased, and many conveyances settled upon the
ground of its having been so repeatedly held, that a voluntary conveyance is fraudulent,
as such, within the Stat. 27th of Eliz: and it is no new thing for the Court to hold itself
concluded in matters respecting real property by former decisions upon questions, in
respect of which, if it were res integra, they probably would have come to very different
conclusions.
227. Robinson v. Bland, 96 Eng. Rep. 141, 142 (KB. 1760).
228. Id. at 144.
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of practice can have no such bad consequences; and therefore they may be al-
tered at pleasure, when found to be absurd or inconvenient.
229
Thus, Judge Wilmot conceived of a bifurcated stare decisis standard
that is reminiscent of that offered by Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Payne. A decision establishing "any rule of property" must be re-
tained, Wihnot says, even when in error. But error in "points of prac-
tice" is a different matter. A change of course on such issues does not
affect reliance interests, and thus the courts may abandon precedents
of this nature with fewer misgivings230
James Kent's conception of stare decisis similarly recognized
the increased importance of stability as to rules of property. As com-
pared to Blackstone, Kent conceived of a relatively aggressive notion
of error correction. Kent's perception was that "the records of many of
the courts in this country are replete with hasty and crude decisions,"
and he openly suggested that "such cases ought to be examined with-
out fear, and revised without reluctance, rather than to have the
character of our law impaired, and the beauty and harmony of the
system destroyed by the perpetuity of error."23
But Kent's conception of error correction was tempered by an
important limitation. He recognized that the policy of stability and
certainty was more important in certain areas of the law than in oth-
ers. When decisions "create a practical rule of property," Kent ex-
plained, they should be adhered to even when subsequent judges
"may feel the hardship, or not perceive the reasonableness, of the
rule."2
229. Id.
230. As with decisions of the modern Supreme Court, the English courts of the founding
era occasionally contradicted themselves on this point, suggesting that error correction might be
appropriate even in cases establishing rules of property. See, e.g., Williams v. Germaine, 108
Eng. Rep. 797, 800-01 (KB. 1827) (Lord Tenterden, C.J.) ("It is of great importance in almost
every case, but particularly in mercantile law, that a rule once laid down and firmly established
and continued to be acted upon for many years should not be changed unless it appears clearly
to have been founded upon wrong principles.").
231. 1 KENT, supra note 94, at *477.
232. Id. at 478. Thomas Cooley's early American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries also
conceived of a bifurcated error-correction standard. 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 70 n.1 (4th ed. 1899). According to Cooley's
Blackstone:
A precedent flatly unreasonable and unjust may be followed if it has been for a long pe-
riod acquiesced in, or if it has become a rule of property, so that titles have been ac-
quired in reliance upon it, and vested rights will be disturbed by overruling it. In such a
case it will be proper to leave the correction of the error to the legislature, which can so
shape its action as to make it prospective only, and thus prevent the injurious conse-
quences that must follow from judicially declaring the previous decision unfounded.
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B. Rules of Property in the Supreme Court
Although the dominant stare decisis question addressed by the
Marshall Court was the extent of the Court's power to abandon prece-
dent on the basis of its correctness, several Marshall Court decisions
acknowledged the notion of enhanced deference to property rules in
the context of yielding to purportedly erroneous decisions of the state
courts.23 3 In addition, the Marshall Court adverted to a similar ap-
proach in the context of suggesting that some deference was owed to a
legislative construction of the Constitution, especially where property
rights were implicated.2- Otherwise, the application and develop-
ment of the rule of property standard in the Supreme Court occurred
in the Taney era.
Indeed, the Taney Court's principal contribution to the stare
decisis dialogue was to consider whether the Court's power of error
correction varied depending on the extent of property and contract
rights at stake. Four overruling decisions are generally attributed to
the Taney Court:2 5 Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston Railroad Co.
v. Letson,26 The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,27 Gazzam v.
Phillip's Lessee,28 and Suydam v. Williamson. 9 These and other de-
cisions in the Taney era offer historical context for the debate between
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Marshall in Payne-whether ar-
guments for adhering to stare decisis are stronger in cases involving
233. See Jackson v. Chew, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 153, 163 (1827) (adopting New York's
standards for the construction of a will on the ground that such decisions established "a rule of
landed property," and indicating the Court's obligation to follow such decisions even if in "error,"
since "it is an error which has been so repeatedly sanctioned by all the Courts of that State, for
the last twenty years, that it has ripened into a settled rule of law"); M'Keen v. Delaney's
Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 22, 32-33 (1809) (doubting the Pennsylvania courts' construction of a
state statute regarding the prerequisites for validity of a deed, but following that construction
because "infinite mischief would ensue, should this court observe a different rule from that
which has long been established in the state" on an issue on which "many titles probably
depend").
234. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of the national bank, based in part on the conclusion that "[a]n exposition of the con-
stitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense property
has been advanced, ought not to be lightly disregarded").
235. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 n.1 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 147, at 2245-46; Blaustein & Field,
supra note 147, at 159-60.
236. Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). For
background on Letson, see CURRIE, supra note 98, at 260-61, and CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 461-66 (1974).
237. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852), superseded by
28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
238. Gazzam v. Phillip's Lessee, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 372 (1858).
239. Suydam v. Williamson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 427 (1861).
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property and contract rights than in cases involving procedural and
evidentiary rules.240
The Taney Court's first discussion of stare decisis appeared in
Justice Wayne's opinion for the Court in Letson. At issue in
Letson was whether the federal courts had diversity jurisdiction over
an action brought by Thomas W. Letson, a New York citizen, against
the Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad Company
("LC&C), a South Carolina corporation. As noted above, Chief
Justice Marshall's broad dictum in Deveaux had asserted that a cor-
poration itself was not a citizen, and that its citizenship for diversity
purposes was to be based on the citizenship of its members.241 Since
some of LC&C's stockholders arguably were New York citizens, coun-
sel for LC&C argued that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
Letson's claim under Deveaux and its progeny. In response, Letson's
counsel attacked Deveaux and urged its reversal.
242
Wayne accepted the invitation to abandon Deveaux, and
authored an opinion holding that a corporation under state law should
be treated as a citizen of that state.243 Wayne first seized upon the
error he saw in Deveaux, noting that its conception of diversity juris-
diction was not consistent with the Constitution or with sound legal
reasoning.244 Wayne seemingly embraced the role of error correction,
expressly "yielding to decided cases every thing that can be claimed
for them on the score of authority except the surrender of con-
science."245 But he went on to imply that the Court's capacity to cor-
rect the error in Deveaux depended on the fact that a broader concep-
tion of corporate citizenship for diversity jurisdiction did not upset
any commercial reliance interests.246 If it had, the implication was
that the error would be preserved.
240. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
241. United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809).
242. See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 515-23
(1844).
243. See id. at 558.
244. See id. at 555-56.
245. Id. at 555.
246. See id. at 556 ("Fortunately a departure from [Deveaux and its progeny] involves no
change in a rule of property."). Wayne's approach was superficially similar to that of Justice
Johnson in dissent in Ex parte Bollman. Johnson had embraced a reexamination of the
"correctness or consistency" of the Court's earlier decisions. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75, 104 (1807) (Johnson, J., dissenting). Wayne looked to the "true principles of interpretation"
of the Constitution and laws to evaluate the "correctness" of a prior ruling. Letson, 43 U.S. (2
How.) at 555. But the difference in methodology is significant. Whereas Johnson's notion of a
"duty" of reexamination seemed to flow from his view that an unprincipled decision "is not law,"
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 104 (Johnson, J., dissenting), Wayne's merits-based approach
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Two Taney Court decisions in 1850 made this point. In
Townsend v. Jemison,24 the plaintiff filed a breach of contract action
in federal court in Alabama on a contract entered into with the defen-
dant in Mississippi. Defendant opposed the action under a three-year
Mississippi statute of limitations.2 The question before the Supreme
Court was whether the Mississippi statute applied on the theory that
it formed a part of the contract (which was entered into in
Mississippi), or whether the longer Alabama statute of limitations
applied on the theory that the statute of limitations merely affected
the remedy.2 9 The Townsend Court reinforced the Court's previous
adoption of the latter view.2 50
Justice Wayne's opinion for the Court volunteered that differ-
ences in opinion on the issue were beside the point, as the issue had
been resolved "by authorities the court is bound to respect.'-"21 In
Wayne's view, "[t]he error, if any has been committed, is too strongly
engrafted into the law -to be removed without the interposition of
some superior authority."22 Error correction, in other words, was
outside the Court's conception of the judicial power. The rule at issue
was unalterable except by the "superior authority" of "legislative en-
actment."2
3
Justice Grier's opinion for the Court in Barnard v. Adamsm set
down a similarly rigid rule in demanding adherence to decisions on
the contribution principle of general average in admiralty law. The
rule of general average required contribution by cargo owners toward
compensation for the loss of a ship sacrificed to save the cargo.2
5 In
Barnard, the question was whether the principle applied when the
ship's destruction was inevitable.2 6 Grier's majority opinion held that
the Court's previous decisions required the conclusion that it did.2
7
Even conceding that the Court's precedents have been subject to
criticism and their correctness may be in doubt, Grier denied that cor-
depended on a different consideration: that rejection ofDeveaux "involve[d] no change in a rule
of property," Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 556.
247. Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407 (1850).
248. See id. at 408.
249. See id. at 413.
250. Id. at 420.
251. Id. at 413-14 (quoting Leroy v. Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. 362, 371 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820)
(No. 8269)).
252. Id. at 414.
253. Id. at 414-15.
254. Barnard v. Adams, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270 (1850).
255. See id. at 303.
256. Id. at 301-02.
257. See id. at 304-05, 307.
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rection of such errors was appropriate: "In questions involving so
much doubt and difficulty, it is of more importance to the mercantile
community that the law be settled, and litigation ended, than how it
is settled."258
The Court's reluctance to overturn purportedly erroneous
precedents in Townsend and Barnard is easily explainable in com-
mercial reliance terms. In Townsend, the settled rule permitted the
owner of a contract claim to rely on the statute of limitations of the
forum state without fear of an intervening time-bar from the state
where the contract was formed. 259 A decision overruling precedent
would upset vested interests in contract claims. In Barnard, the mer-
cantile community had come to rely on the availability of contribution
in general average even in cases of inevitable destruction.260 In either
case, overruling precedent would have upset settled expectations in
the commercial context, and error correction was thus improper.
26 '
Chief Justice Taney continued the rule of property theme in
his opinion for the Court in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh.262
The Genesee Chief presented the question whether the federal courts'
admiralty jurisdiction extended to a suit arising out of a collision on
Lake Ontario. 263  Presumably, the federal courts would have lacked
jurisdiction under the Court's earlier pronouncement as to the scope
of Article III's Admiralty Clause in The Steam-Boat Thomas
258. Id. at 302. Although the preference for stability over accuracy is often attributed to
Justice Brandeis, see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997), Grier and his nineteenth-
century contemporaries were quite familiar with this notion, at least in the context of a case in-
volving a "rule of property."
As in the modem Court, however, the preference for stability was not always consistent.
Justice Field's majority opinion in Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 154 U.S. 288 (1894),
sought to justify rejection of the established rule that rules vesting title in government land to
railroads upon construction of tracks and telegraph lines with the conclusion that accuracy is
paramount: "It is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate
consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations." Id. at 322. Field's
analysis harkened back to Johnson's declaratory approach, arguing that "Itihose doctrines only
will eventually stand which bear the strictest examination, and the test of experience." Id. The
Barden dissent's response was more in line with the then-dominant approach. "If ever there
was a case in which the rule stare decisis should prevail," it is on an issue that would "unsettleO
the question of title to... lands." Id. at 349 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
259. Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407,413 (1850).
260. Barnard, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 303.
261. Cf Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434, 439 (1865) (noting, in rejecting
plaintiffs argument that the Court should abandon certain rules of evidence applicable to
proving the validity of title to Mexican land in California, that "[tihe right of property, as every
other valuable right, depends in a great measure for its security on the stability of judicial deci-
sions").
262. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852).
263. Id. at 451.
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Jefferson.264 Justice Story's opinion for the Court in The Thomas
Jefferson had held that admiralty under Article III extended only to
cases where the voyage at issue "was substantially performed, or to be
performed, upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb and flow of
the tide."265  Because the Missouri River voyage in The Thomas
Jefferson "not only in its commencement and termination, but in all
its intermediate progress, was several hundreds of miles above the
ebb and flow of the tide," Story's opinion held that any exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction in the case was beyond that authorized by
Article 111.266
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in The Genesee Chief candidly
overruled The Thomas Jefferson and adopted a new test for admiralty
jurisdiction. Taney argued that the Thomas Jefferson test would un-
dermine the goal of "a perfect equality in the rights and the privileges
of the citizens of the different states," in that the benefits of "safety
and convenience of commerce, and the speedy decision of controver-
sies" presented by the admiralty courts would be reserved only for
"states bordering on the Atlantic."267 Moreover, Taney asserted that
the "ebb and flow" test was "arbitrary, without any foundation in rea-
son" in that "there is certainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide
that makes the waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction,
nor any thing in the absence of a tide that renders it unfit."268 Thus,
even though the ebb and flow test concededly was the prevailing
standard in England at the time of the framing of the Constitution,
Chief Justice Taney rejected it as "purely artificial and arbitrary as
well as unjust."269 Accordingly, Taney concluded that the admiralty
jurisdiction properly turned on whether the waters at issue are navi-
gable, and not on whether they are within the ebb and flow of the
tide.27o
Despite the conviction of Taney's disdain for the rationale and
correctness of The Thomas Jefferson, he expressly admitted to a cer-
tain degree of angst in overruling the case: "It is the decision in the
case of the Thomas Jefferson which mainly embarrasses the court in
the present inquiry. We are sensible of the great weight to which it is
264. The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 428 (1825).
265. Id. at 429.
266. Id.
267. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 454.
268. Id.




entitled."271  Having noted the general importance of adherence to
precedent, however, Taney emphasized that "[tihe case of the Thomas
Jefferson did not decide any question of property, or lay down any rule
by which the right of property should be determined."272 Taney
explained that if The Thomas Jefferson had established a rule of
property, stare decisis would have demanded adherence to that
decision:
If it had, we should have felt ourselves bound to follow it notwithstanding the
opinion we have expressed. For every one would suppose that after the deci-
sion of this court, in a matter of that kind, he might safely enter into contracts,
upon the faith that rights thus acquired would not be disturbed. In such a
case, stare decisis is the safe and established rule of judicial policy and should
always be adhered to.... But the decision referred to has no relation to rights
of property. It was a question of jurisdiction only, and the judgment we now
give can disturb no rights of property nor interfere with any contracts hereto-
fore made.... And as we are convinced that the former decision was founded
in error, and that the error, if not corrected, must produce serious public as
well as private inconvenience and loss, it becomes our duty not to perpetuate
it.2 73
Like Wayne and Grier, Taney suggested that the Court had the power
to correct clear errors in precedent only if the decision in question did
not affect a rule concerning property rights.274
The Taney Court's remaining discussions of stare decisis are
somewhat more puzzling and difficult to reconcile with the above.
Two terms after The Genesee Chief, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co.,275 the Court seemingly contradicted Taney's conclusion
that decisions concerning jurisdiction are particularly vulnerable to
reversal. Justice Grier's majority opinion in Marshall reaffirmed the
substance of Letson in holding that corporations are, for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, to be treated as citizens of the state in which
they reside.276 In so holding, Grier went out of his way to affirm the
importance of adherence to precedent in that case. In apparent
27L Id. at 456.
272. Id. at 458.
273. Id. at 458-59. David Currie has suggested that The Genesee Chief was "the Court's
most comprehensive treatment of stare decisis in constitutional cases" to date, and that it was
"only the second time the Court had overruled a constitutional decision" (the first being Letson).
CURRIE, supra note 98, at 258. Elsewhere, Taney's opinion in The Genesee Chief has been de-
scribed as illustrating "the manner in which the law changes to meet changed external condi-
tions." SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 103. But as the above demonstrates, Taney's willingness to
overturn The Thomas Jefferson turned on much more than a perception of changed conditions.
274. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 458.
275. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
276. Id. at 328.
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contradiction of The Genesee Chief, Grier went so far as to suggest
that "t]here are no cases, where an adherence to the maxim of 'stare
decisis' is so absolutely necessary to the peace of society, as those
which affect retroactively the jurisdiction of courts."277
Gazzam v. Phillip's Lessee provided another puzzle. The op-
posing parties in Gazzam asserted competing claims to a parcel of
public land278 subdivided and purchased under "[an Act making
further provision for the sale of the public lands" (the "Act").279 It was
undisputed that the parcel in question had been included in the
property described in the patent and certificate of purchase issued to
Gazzam's predecessor in interest (William D. Stone), and had not
been included in the property described in the patent and certificate
of purchase issued to Phillip's lessee's predecessor (James
Etheridge).280 But Phillip's lessee nevertheless claimed title to the
parcel on the ground that the Act required that the parcel in question
be included in the property described in the patent and certificate of
purchase.21 Specifically, Phillip's lessee asserted that the Act
required the United States Surveyor General to subdivide fractional
sections of the public lands into half-quarter sections, and that the
lands surveyed and conveyed to Etheridge had fallen short of an
entire half-quarter section, while the lands surveyed and conveyed to
Stone had included a parcel that would have made Etheridge's half-
quarter section complete.22 Accordingly, Phillip's lessee claimed that
Gazzam's interest (through Stone) should be restrained by the parcel
in question and that Phillip's lessee had a right (through Etheridge)
to the land necessary to complete his half-quarter section.28
Twelve years earlier, the Court had accepted the identical ar-
gument (in connection with the identical parcel of land) in Brown's
Lessee v. Clements.2 The Court in Brown's Lessee had held that "the
patent granted to Stone [was] void" and that Etheridge was entitled
to the land necessary to complete his half-quarter section, despite the
277. Id. at 325. Professor Currie notes that Grier's dictum "was precisely the opposite of
what the Court had said two terms earlier in The Genesee Chief," and that his "point also
seemed especially inappropriate because Letson, the very decision he now pronounced
immutable, had itself unceremoniously discarded another jurisdictional precedent." CURRIE,
supra note 98, at 261.
278. Gazzam v. Philip's Lessee, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 372 (1857).
279. Brown's Lessee v. Clements, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 650, 653 (1845).
280. See Gazzam, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 375-76.
281. See id. at 374.
282. See id. at 374-75.
283. See id. at 375.
284. Brown's Lessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 650.
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conceded fact "that as Etheridge only paid for the quantity of land
mentioned in his patent, that he can have no right to land paid for by
Stone, and included in his patent."2 Gazzam soundly rejected
Brown's Lessee on that point, concluding that it was inconsistent with
the language of the Act in question. 286 The Act provided "that frac-
tional sections containing one hundred and sixty acres or upwards
shall, in like manner, as nearly as practicable, be subdivided into half-
quarter sections,'"287 thus preserving "some latitude of discretion" in
the Surveyor General to subdivide public lands into less than half-
quarter sections, and obviating any basis for disregarding the clear
language of the patents in question.28 In so holding, the Gazzam
Court conceded that "some rights may be disturbed by refusing to fol-
low the opinion expressed in [Brown's Lessee]," but nevertheless re-
jected that precedent as irreconcilable with the language of the Act.289
Finally, in Suydam v. Williamson, the Taney Court set aside
another precedent despite its concession that property had been
bought and sold in reliance on a prior opinion.290 The issues in
Suydam concerned the validity under New York law of a conveyance
of property from Thomas B. Clarke to Peter McIntyre and the
adequacy of consideration to support that conveyance. 291 When the
propriety of the same conveyance had previously arisen in Williamson
v. Berry and companion cases, the Court (over dissents from Chief
Justice Taney and Justices Catron and Nelson) had upheld it based
on its understanding of New York case law.292 Justice Campbell's
opinion for the Court in Suydam expressly overruled Williamson in
light of more recent New York authority, while acknowledging the
irregularity of self-reversal under the circumstances. 293 But despite
the obvious commercial property interests at stake, the Court in
Suydam overruled Williamson in favor of its more recent
understanding of New York law.94
285. Id. at 667-68.
286. Gazzam, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 376.
287. Id. at 376 (quoting Act of April 24, 1820 (3 U.S. St., at 566) (emphasis added)).
288. Id. at 377.
289. Id. at 378.
290. Suydam v. Williamson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 427,431 (1860).
291. Id.
292. Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495, 549 (1850), cited in Suydam v. Williamson,
65 U.S. (24 How.) 427, 427 (1860) (stating that "[tihe facts of the case are stated in the opinion of
the court, and also in the report of the cases in 8 Howard.... The points of law involved in the
case are fully stated in the reports in 8 Howard").
293. Suydam, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 431, 435. "Every principle by which our law of
precedents is justified, tends against the reopening of the case in this court." Id. at 431.
294. Id. at 435.
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C. Rules of Property and Reliance Interests: A Comparative Analysis
By the founding era, English courts and American commenta-
tors had embraced the notion of an enhanced rule of stare decisis in
cases involving rules of property. That principle also dominated the
Court's treatment of precedent during the Taney era. Indeed, on
closer scrutiny even the apparent anomalies noted above disappear.
The extent of the Taney Court's willingness to correct apparently er-
roneous precedent turned entirely on whether a change of course
would "distrb... rights of property... or interfere with any
contracts heretofore made."295
Letson abandoned Deveaux's restrictive conception of corporate
citizenship in diversity jurisdiction as inconsistent with the
Constitution.29 Townsend and Barnard preserved the Court's prece-
dents despite doubting their correctness and expressing concerns that
they were in error. The difference in attitude toward error correction
is easily explainable in commercial reliance terms. A more expansive
conception of diversity jurisdiction for corporations obviously dis-
turbed no property rights and interfered with no existing contracts.
Townsend and Barnard, by contrast, clearly involved such commercial
reliance interests.
The rule of property standard also explains the apparent con-
tradiction between the The Genesee Chief, which had suggested that
error correction was particularly appropriate as to questions of juris-
diction,297 and Marshall, which had asserted that there were no cases
where stare decisis was so necessary as those affecting jurisdiction.298
In The Genesee Chief, the Court decided to discard what it viewed as
an unduly restrictive jurisdictional test. Because a decision to expand
federal admiralty jurisdiction did not disturb rights of property or in-
terfere with any contracts, the Court embraced a duty to correct a
decision "without any foundation in reason."299
In Marshall, by contrast, the Court was being asked to discard
what the parties viewed as an overly-expansive jurisdictional test.
Because a decision to restrict federal diversity jurisdiction plainly
would have interfered with vested rights of the parties who had rea-
295. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 459 (1852),
superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994).
296. Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555-56
(1844).
297. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 458.
298. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 325 (1853).
299. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 454,458-59.
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sonably relied on the finality of the federal court's decision, the
Marshall Court disclaimed any ability to adopt a more restrictive ju-
risdictional test. In light of the then-prevailing rules liberally per-
mitting collateral attack based on lack of jurisdiction,'30 a decision re-
tracting the standards for federal diversity jurisdiction would have
upset the settled rights of parties that had received federal judgments
under the Letson standard. Justice Grier's opinion in Marshall failed
to put the point precisely in the language of commercial reliance, but
he clearly appreciated the general point:
[Letson] has, for the space of ten years, been received by the bar as a final set-
tlement of the questions which have so frequently arisen under this clause of
the Constitution; and the practice and forms of pleading in the courts of the
United States have been conformed to it. Confiding in its stability, numerous
controversies involving property and interests to a large amount, have been
heard and decided by the circuit courts, and by this court; and many are still
pending here, where the jurisdiction has been assumed on the faith of the suf-
ficiency of such an averment. If we should now declare these judgments to
have been entered without jurisdiction or authority, we should inflict a great
and irreparable evil on the community.
301
Taney's concurrence in Grier's opinion is hardly puzzling in
this light. Despite the facial contradiction between Taney's and
Grier's statements regarding the precedential value of jurisdictional
decisions, Taney's general approach in The Genesee Chief supported
Grier's conclusions in Marshall: "For every one would suppose that
after the decision of this court, in a matter of that kind, he might
safely enter into contracts [or seek a judgment of a federal court in
diversity], upon the faith that rights thus acquired would not be dis-
turbed."'
02
Respect for vested property rights also explains the apparent
anomalies in the Taney Court's rhetoric in Gazzam and Suydam. The
Gazzam Court conceded that rejection of Brown's Lessee would dis-
turb certain interests in property that had been built around that de-
cision, but the Court's opinion reveals that retention of Brown's Lessee
would have done even more violence to vested property rights.30' For
decades, conveyances of public lands had logically relied on the
proposition that the land conveyed would naturally correspond with
300. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 261 n.190 (noting that "nineteenth-century doctrine
seems to have freely allowed collateral attack on judgments for want of jurisdiction," and citing
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (8 Wall.) 457 (1873), in support).
301. Marshall, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 325.
302. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 458.
303. Gazzam v. Phillip's Lessee, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 372, 377-78 (1857).
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the property described in the patents and certificates of purchase304
Continued retention of Brown's Lessee would interfere with the "vast
tracts of the public domain surveyed and sold" in reliance on the fore-
going proposition, and the Gazzam Court simply concluded that less
disruption would result from a decision overruling Brown's Lessee
than a decision "adhering to a principle which we think unsound, and
which, in its practical operation, will unsettle the surveys and subdi-
visions of fractional sections of the public land, running through a
period of some twenty-eight years."305
Suydam's rhetoric is explainable on similar grounds. Its re-
jection of Williamson's decision to uphold the conveyance in question
was based on an intervening development in New York law, which
was controlling306 Thus, the Suydam decision could easily be under-
stood to turn on subsequent developments in case law that under-
mined the decision in Williamson. But Suydam is also explainable in
"rules of property" terms. Justice Campbell's concession-that over-
ruling precedent undermines common law principles307-ignored a
crucial policy behind an enhanced standard of deference to rules of
property. Certainty in rules of property is important not only to pro-
tect vested reliance interests, but also to enable future transactions to
move forward in reliance on settled legal principles. If the Suydam
Court had retained the Williamson rule of property in competition
with the more recently considered New York standard, the harm from
the resulting chaos and confusion would far outweigh the minimal
disturbance to the specific reliance interests in question.30o As in
304. See id. at 376-78.
305. Id. at 372, 378.
306. Suydam v. Williamson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 427, 433 (1860).
307. See id. at 431.
308. Indeed, Campbell might have cited Chief Justice Marshall in support of this conclu-
sion. In a similar case, Marshall had explained the virtues of overruling a previous decision on
a matter of property in deference to a recent change in state law:
[In construing the statutes of a state on which land titles depend, infinite mischief
would ensue, should this court observe a different rule from that which has long been
established in the state; and in this case, the court cannot doubt that the courts of
Pennsylvania consider a justice of the supreme court as within the description of the
act.... On this evidence the court yields the construction which would be put on the
words of the act, to that which the courts of the state have put on it, and on which many
titles probably depend.
M'Keen v. Delancy's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 22, 32-33 (1809); cf Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd.
v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 381-82 (1977) (dealing with a question of state
sovereignty rather than substantive property law and finding stare decisis principles less com-
pelling). In Corvallis Sand, 429 U.S. at 382, the Court overruled Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona,
414 U.S. 313 (1973), which had held that federal common law controlled the ownership of lands
that had re-emerged from the bed of a navigable stream. Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 324-25.
The Corvallis Sand court returned to the rule that had prevailed prior to Bonelli, that new
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Gazzam, less disruption resulted from a rejection of Williamson than
a retention of that decision would have produced.
By the Taney era, then, the Court had settled on a bifurcated
stare decisis standard comparable to that advocated by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Payne. Townsend, Barnard, and Marshall made clear
that "[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis [were] at their acme in
cases involving property and contract rights,"30 9 so much so that the
Court disclaimed any power to correct erroneous precedents in such
cases. Letson and The Genesee Chief established the converse point,
that the opposite was true in cases involving procedural and eviden-
tiary rules.310
The founding generation had not, however, addressed the diffi-
culty presented by cases falling in neither of the above categories.
Thus, the principal doctrinal development of the modern era on the
issue of reliance has been the extension of this principle to interests
beyond the commercial context. The primary extension offered in
modern opinions is the notion that in some instances, governmental
action predicated on judicial precedent should be protected by an en-
hanced standard of stare decisis.3" Such an extension of the rule of
property formulation apparently had not taken hold in the founding
era or the early decisions of the Supreme Court. As a general matter,
however, the extension is difficult to quarrel with as a natural appli-
cation of founding-era principles. If private investment in contract
and property interests is sufficient to demand adherence to arguably
erroneous precedent, public investment in governmental structures
should produce a similar effect. Indeed, even the most ardent critics
of stare decisis concede the need to retain precedents around which
vast governmental structures are built, such as the modern adminis-
states admitted into the Union have the same rights as the original states in lands under their
navigable waters, and that, other than passage of title at the time of statehood, ownership of
such lands is controlled by state law. Corvallis Sand, 429 U.S. at 378, 381. In so doing, the
Court noted that the "concern for unsettling titles would lead us to overrule Bonelli, rather than
to retain it." Id. at 382. "Since one system of resolution of property disputes has been adhered
to from 1845 until 1973, and the other only for the past three years," the Court concluded that
"a return to the former would more closely conform to the expectations of property owners than
would adherence to the latter." Id.
309. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
310. See, e.g., id. (noting the dichotomy between rules of property, on one hand, and
procedural and evidentiary rules, on the other).
311. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), should not be
overruled because it "has had a pervasive effect upon statutory law, automatically assuring that
private damages actions created by Federal law do not extend against the states" and noting
that "[florty-nine Congresses since Hans have legislated under that assurance").
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trative state.3 12 The Rehnquist Court has understandably struggled in
its attempts to identify the logical end of this extension, 13 but at a
general level the extension is a natural outgrowth of principles with a
long historical pedigree.
3 14
V. STARE DECISIS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY
NATURE OF THE DECISION
Amidst all the contradictions and retractions in the modern
Court's doctrine of precedent, one point has achieved an unusual de-
gree of consensus: that stare decisis has "great weight.., in the area
312. See Cooper, supra note 3, at 410 ("Surely a judge need not vote to overrule an errone-
ous precedent if to do so would pitch the country into the abyss"); see also ROBERT H. BORC, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA. TaE POLITCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 155-59 (1990) (arguing that
substantial institutional reliance on precedent can protect it from overruling even if it deviated
from original understanding); Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 431 (noting that "constitutional
rules establish governmental structures" which are "the framework for all political
interactions," and have widespread effects on governmental planning); Monaghan, supra note 2,
at 749-50 (asserting that "stare decisis operates to promote systemwide stability and continuity
by ensuring the survival of governmental norms that have achieved unsurpassed importance in
American society," and that "[s]uch norms include the freedom from racial discrimination by the
government, the general reach of the commerce clause, and even the legality of paper money").
313. Reliance in the form of legislative creation of governmental structures seems closely
analogous to the commercial reliance recognized in the founding era. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Stare decisis operates with great
force in counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting the
congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature.... Congress can regulate
in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose
to build a stable national economy."); Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197,
200, 202-03 (1991) (refusing to overrule Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), which
held that FELA creates a cause of action against a state-owned railroad enforceable in state
court, and noting that "[wlorkers' compensation laws in many States specifically exclude rail-
road workers from their coverage because of the assumption that FELA provides adequate pro-
tection for those workers"). But more difficult questions arise when the analogy is stretched to
executive reliance on precedent. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714 (1995)
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 723 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). And the analogy is
stretched to the breaking point when it is extended to reliance by individuals who may "have
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and
their places in society" on the assumption of the validity of a certain decision. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855-56 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., plurality
opinion) (recognizing that the classic case for weighing reliance heavily in favor of following the
earlier rule occurs in the commercial context," but nevertheless attempting to lay claim to the
foregoing notion of reliance); id. at 956 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (chiding the plurality for its "unconventional-and unconvincing-notion of reliance").
314. The implications of this extension should not be overlooked, however. A principle of
stare decisis that insulates precedent from further review on the basis of what might be termed
"structural" governmental reliance interests creates an inherent bias in favor of expansion of
governmental power. Judicial decisions expanding governmental power are entitled to a strong
presumption of deference on the basis of governmental reliance interests, but decisions restrict-
ing governmental power are more freely open to review in light of the absence of any such reli-
ance.
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of statutory construction"31s but "is at its weakest" in constitutional
cases.316  Two principal justifications have been offered for a
diminished standard of deference to constitutional decisions. The
first seeks the moral high ground of the judicial oath to uphold the
Constitution. Justice Scalia set forth his view of this argument in his
dissent in South Carolina v. Gathers:
317
I would think it a violation of my oath to adhere to what I consider a plainly
unjustified intrusion upon the democratic process in order that the Court
might save face. With some reservation concerning decisions that have become
so embedded in our system of government that return is no longer possible (a
description that surely does not apply to Booth), I agree with Justice Douglas:
"A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere
past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all
else that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the
gloss which his predecessors have put on it."
315
The second justification emphasizes the unique difficulty of
overturning constitutional decisions outside the judicial process. In
the Rehnquist Court, this argument is often made by reference to
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., whose
memorable prose has since become a mandatory part of the burial rite
for any constitutional precedent:
Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, a universal inexorable com-
mand.... Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious con-
cern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the
Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically
impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows
to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that
315. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996).
316. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,235-38 (1997).
317. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824-25 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
majority in Gathers adhered to its holding in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987), that
the Eighth Amendment bars admission of victim-impact evidence during the penalty phase of a
capital trial. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810-11. As noted above, the Gathers majority position was
short-lived; it took only two years (and the appointment of Justice Souter to the Court) for the
Gathers dissenters to garner a fifth vote for their inclination to overrule Booth's construction of
the Eighth Amendment. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 (1991).
318. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 824-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting William 0. Douglas, Stare
Decisis, 49 CoLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949)); see also Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that the only correct rule of
decision is "the constitution itself and not what we have said about it"); Lawson, supra note 16;
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is,
83 GEo. L.J. 217, 319 n.349 (1994) ('"The Constitution and federal statutes are written law (not
common law); judges are bound by their oaths to interpret that law as they understand it, not as
it has been understood by others.").
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the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate
also in the judicial function.
319
Brandeis' argument seeks to distinguish constitutional precedent
from other decisions by isolating the principal policy weighing against
stare decisis-that of correcting judicial error-and by emphasizing
the comparative difficulty of extra-judicial error correction in the con-
stitutional realm.320
The notion of enhanced deference to statutory decisions hinges
on a corollary of this second argument. Because "Congress, not th[e]
Court, has the responsibility for revising its statutes," the Rehnquist
Court has often expressed a heightened reluctance to overturn statu-
tory precedent.32' The nature of the inference from congressional in-
action has varied over the years, from the bold presumption that si-
lence constitutes tacit approval of the precedent in question,322 to the
more modest assertion that inaction "may be probative to varying de-
grees" even if it "cannot be regarded as acquiescence under all cir-
cumstances."32
Members of the modern Court have expressed occasional
qualms about the soundness of the constitutional/statutory dichot-
omy. Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the policy of judicial in-
319. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted). Burnet upheld Coronado Oil & Gas Company's exemption from federal
income taxes, on the theory that Coronado was an "instrumentality" of state government since it
produced its oil under a lease of state school lands. Id. at 400-01. The majority opinion in
Burnet found this conclusion to follow necessarily from Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501
(1922), and thus "adhere[d] to the rule there approved." Burnet, 285 U.S. at 398. For a related
argument for the notion of a weak standard of constitutional stare decisis, see New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 590-91 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (asserting that "it is a wise
policy which largely restricts [stare decisis] to those areas of the law where correction can be
had by legislation," since "Co]therwise the Constitution loses the flexibility necessary if it is to
serve the needs of successive generations").
320. For a discussion of the economic considerations behind this and related arguments,
see Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the
Supreme Court's Doctrine of Precedent sec. VI (Mar. 12, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
321. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 296 (1996). But see State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3 (1997). In !han, the Court overruled Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968),
which had held that vertical maximum price fixing is a per se violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Khan, 522 U.S. at 22. In so doing, the Court asserted that "the general
presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to
the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress 'expected the courts to give shape
to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.'" Id. at 20-21 (quoting
National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
322. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 468-89 (1940) (refusing to rescind the
application of the Sherman Act to labor unions, since Congress was aware of the issue and did
not legislate).
323. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987).
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tegrity "is in many respects even more critical in adjudication involv-
ing constitutional liberties than in adjudication involving commercial
entitlements."324
Justice Scalia has questioned the statutory corollary. In his
view, the notion that congressional inaction spells approval is based
on "the patently false premise that the correctness of statutory con-
struction is to be measured by what the current Congress desires,
rather than by what the law as enacted meant," and requires suspen-
sion of "rudimentary principles of political science."
3
5
324. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 852-53 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall
noted that:
Because enforcement of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment frequently
requires this Court to rein in the forces of democratic politics, this Court can legiti-
mately lay claim to compliance with its directives only if the public understands the
Court to be implementing 'principles... founded in the law rather than in the proclivi-
ties of individuals.'
Id. at 853 (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)). Academic critics have offered
parallel arguments. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GovERNmENT 50 (1976) (noting that frequent overrulings "undermine the belief that judges are
not unrestrainedly asserting their individual or collective wills, but following a law which binds
them as well as the litigants"); Maltz, supra note 4, at 484 (stating that "[tlhe Court's continued
ability to function effectively... depends on the willingness of the public to accept the
Court... this acceptance in turn depends upon the public perception that in each case the
majority of the Court is speaking for the Constitution itself rather than simply for five or more
lawyers in black robes."). Others question the logical extent of the Brandeis argument, noting
that the Court's "nonactivist" decisions (those declining to extend individual constitutional
rights) are in fact subject to "correction" by the legislative process. Id. at 471; see also
Monaghan, supra note 2, at 742 (noting that in decisions rejecting autonomy or equality claims
"the results (if not the decisions) can be 'overruled' by statute"). But see City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 534-36 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers in
attempting to overrule Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that stare decisis should be particularly weak in constitutional cases, since, "as this case so
plainly illustrates--'correction through legislative action is practically impossible'" in such
cases (quoting Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996))). Another critic attacks the
Brandeis argument at its foundation, asserting that the "hard" process of amendment under
Article V was according to the Framers' design and that the "[r]eady overruling of constitutional
cases interferes with" the two objectives behind that process: ensuring the stability of
governmental structure and assuring super-majoritarian support for any constitutional rule.
Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 430-31 (arguing that in addition to reducing the "stability of
governmental institutions," a relaxed stare decisis standard in constitutional cases "saps the
drive for change in the constitutional text," thus undermining the goal of ensuring supor-
majoritarian support for constitutional rules).
325. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 671-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, Scalia has argued
that it is:
impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act repre-
sents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter
the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or
even (5) political cowardice.
Id. at 672; see also Khan, 522 U.S. at 19-22 (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968), which had held that vertical maximum price fixing is a per se violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, and stating that the Court "infer[red] little meaning from the fact that
Congress has not reacted legislatively to Albrecht").
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The modern Court has vaguely sought to trace its differential
standard of deference to a long-established practice.26 But the Court
has had a difficult time attributing this approach beyond decisions
from the twentieth century. A commonly cited source for the Court's
approach is Justice Brandeis' dissent in Burne. 327 Despite the
sweeping rhetoric quoted above, however, Brandeis offered little sup-
port for any historic practice in support of his view. With a few ex-
ceptions noted below, the voluminous cases cited in Brandeis' lengthy
footnotes simply exemplified instances in which the Court had over-
ruled previous decisions, without consciously adopting a different
standard based on the constitutional or statutory nature of the deci-
sions.32
A few commentators have vaguely speculated that it was not
until this century that "the Court explicitly articulate[d] a rationale
for the proposition that precedents should carry less weight in consti-
tutional adjudication than in cases of statutory construction."39 But
For the most part, commentators agree with Scalia's rejection of the "retrospective theory of
congressional acquiescence," on the ground that it "fails to reflect the realities of the legislative
process and is inconsistent with the established goals of statutory interpretation." Lawrence C.
Marshall, "Let Congress Do It". The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88
MICH. L. REV. 177, 182-83 (1989); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory
Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) (criticizing the "super-strong presumption of correct-
ness" for statutory precedents). But see Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative
Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2, 12-13 (1988) (arguing that "enacting legislators
would prefer that courts give strong weight to stare decisis in statutory cases, even at the ex-
pense of fidelity to the original legislative deal"). Even so, at least one commentator has called
for an "absolute" rule of deference to statutory precedent, on a separation of powers theory that
a looser standard presents "countermajoritarian difficulties" by involving the courts in "the de-
velopment of statutory law." Marshall, supra, at 183; see also Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 430-
31 (arguing that constitutional precedents are entitled to more deference than statutory ones in
light of the intentionally hard process of constitutional amendment).
326. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) ("We have long recognized, of
course, that the doctrine of stare decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional prece-
dents .... ."); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 590-91 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("[Throughout the history of the Court stare decisis has had only a limited application in the
field of constitutional law."); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) ("In constitutional
questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action this Court
throughout its history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional
decisions. This has long been accepted practice, and this practice has continued to this day.").
327. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-12 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
328. Brandeis did cite two dissents and one majority opinion from the nineteenth century
that purportedly adopted his approach. See id. at 408 n.3 (citing Barden v. Northern Pac. R.R.
Co., 154 U.S. 288, 322 (1894) (discussed supra note 258); Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 439, 444 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting) (discussed infra note 383); The Passenger Cases,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (discussed infra notes 364-76 and
accompanying text)).
329. James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare
Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 349-50 (1986); see also
Eskridge, supra note 325, at 1364-65 (1988) (asserting that it was not "until the twentieth cen-
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neither the Court nor its critics have bothered to trace the Court's
historical treatment of this issue in any detail.
A. Constitutional and Statutory Precedent in the Founding Era
Founding-era commentary was decidedly agnostic as to the
stare decisis significance of the constitutional or statutory nature of a
precedent. The notion of an enhanced standard of deference to statu-
tory decisions apparently had not occurred to the founding genera-
tion-treatises and other commentary are silent on the issue. And
while some commentators considered the notion of diminished defer-
ence to constitutional decisions, they generally rejected it.330
James Madison addressed the deference owing to constitu-
tional precedent in the context of his attempts to justify his change of
heart as to the constitutionality of a national bank.33 1 In apparent re-
sponse to the charge that Madison had contradicted his earlier views
on the merits of this issue, he responded that although his "abstract
opinion of the text of the Constitution" had not changed, he had given
in to "a course of authoritative expositions" by the courts as "evidence
of the public will necessarily overruling individual opinions."332 As
noted above, Madison contemplated two policy bases for adhering to
precedent. The first is based on the familiar goals of certainty and
stability: "that the good of society requires that the rules of conduct of
its members should be certain and known."333
Madison's second argument is more complex: A judicial
decision that is "publicly made" and "repeatedly confirmed by the con-
stituted authority" creates an inference of "sanction" or consent by the
people.334 Madison stopped short of explaining the precise basis for
the inference, but his comments suggest that it arises out of the fact
that the people retain the ultimate authority both to "ma[k]e the law
through their legislative organ" and to "determine[] its meaning
through their judiciary organ."35 With this background, one might
have expected Madison to join Justice Brandeis in suggesting a dimin-
tury" that the notion of a "hierarchy in which constitutional precedents would be treated with
less deference than statutory precedents... mature[d] into widely cited doctrine").
330. See infra notes 326-43,399-401,420-21 and accompanying text.
331. See Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted
in MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 87, at 391.
332. Letter from James Madison to C.E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 1831), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 92, at 442-43.
333. Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in





ished standard of deference to constitutional precedent. If the basis
for adherence to precedent is the constructive consent of the people,
the fiction of consent seems less appropriate on issues of constitu-
tional law, where correction by the people through the legislature is
much more cumbersome.
In fact, however, Madison soundly rejected that conclusion,
arguing instead that stare decisis applied with equal force to consti-
tutional decisions:
Can it be of less consequence that the meaning of a Constitution should be
fixed and known, than that the meaning of a law should be so? Can, indeed, a
law be fixed in its meaning and operation unless the Constitution be so? On
the contrary, if a particular Legislature, differing in the construction of the
Constitution from a series of preceding constructions, proceed to act on that
difference, they not only introduce uncertainty and instability in the
Constitution, but in the laws themselves; inasmuch as all laws preceding the
new construction and inconsistent with it are not only annulled for the future,
but virtually pronounced nullities from the beginning.
33 6
By focusing on his first policy argument for stare decisis (and largely
ignoring the second), Madison concluded that the doctrine applied
with equal (or greater) force in constitutional cases.337 Madison failed
to address the implications of his second policy argument, which ar-
guably could have led him to a different conclusion. Instead, he sim-
ply asserted that "i]t cannot be less necessary that the meaning of a
Constitution should be freed from uncertainty, than that the law
should be so. "
38
In reaching this conclusion, Madison did address the judicial
oath argument adverted to above. If a judge is under an oath to sup-
port the law, Madison explained, it might be argued that the judge
336. Id.
337. See id.
338. Letter from James Madison to C.E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 1831), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 92, at 443. Anti-Federalist sentiment at the time of the
founding was of similar effect. Brutus indirectly indicated a parallel understanding of the value
of constitutional precedent in the course of lamenting the federal courts' anticipated accretions
on state power:
Perhaps nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state
governments than the constitution of the judicial. They will be able to extend the limits
of the general government gradually, and by insensible degrees, and to accommodate
themselves to the temper of the people. Their decisions on the meaning of the con-
stitution will commonly take place in cases which arise between individuals, with which
the public will not be generally acquainted; one adjudication will form a precedent to the
next, and this to a following one.
Essays of Brutus XV (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 79,
at 441.
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would be constrained to follow his "own construction of it" and to re-
ject a contrary interpretation adopted by precedent3s 9 As soon as he
stated this argument, however, Madison quickly rejected it:
Yet, has it ever been supposed that he [the judge] was required or at liberty to
disregard all precedents, however solemnly repeated and regularly observed,
and, by giving effect to his own abstract and individual opinions, to disturb the
established course of practice in the business of the community? ... There is,
in fact and in common understanding, a necessity of regarding a course of
practice, as above characterized, in the light of a legal rule of interpreting a
law, and there is a like necessity of considering it a constitutional rule of in-
terpreting a Constitution.
3 40
Madison's rejection of the judicial oath argument is two-
pronged. First, and most fundamentally, Madison seems to imply
that the judicial oath is no basis for distinguishing the Constitution
from other laws. The judge's oath extends, at least by implication un-
der the Supremacy Clause,341 to federal statutes and treaties made
under its provisions. Thus, if the judge's oath implies a duty to sup-
port his own interpretation of the Constitution, "however different
from that put on it by his predecessors," the same obligation logically
applies to questions of statutory interpretation.342 The logical end of
the oath argument, then, is not a reduced standard of deference to
339. Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in
MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 87, at 391-92.
340. Id. at 392.
341. See Paulsen, supra note 318, at 260 (suggesting that the judicial oath under Article VI
of the Constitution "requires faithful interpretation of the Constitution (and, by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, of treaties and laws made in pursuance of the
Constitution)"). The text of the oath administered to Supreme Court Justices reinforces this ar-
gument by failing to draw any express distinction between the Constitution and other laws of
the United States. The oath administered by Chief Justice Rehnquist to new Associate Justices
is as follows:
I, , do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to
persons and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and im-
partially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States under the Constitution and Laws of the
United States, so help me God.
Oath of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court (on file with the author); see also Kneeland
v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 497, 524 (1862). The Kneeland court stated that:
But it is said, that if all other grounds fail, our oaths to support the constitution im-
peratively require us to determine every constitutional question according to our own
views of the true construction of the instrument without regard to previous decisions.
The effect of the argument urged upon this point would be to take decisions upon consti-
tutional questions entirely out of the maxim stare decisis. Yet I can see no reason for
confining it to constitutional questions only. Our oaths faithfiflly to discharge the duties
of our office, as much bind us to sustain the law, as our oaths to support the constitution
require us to enforce that.
342. Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in
MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 87, at 391.
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constitutional questions, but a wholesale abandonment of stare deci-
sis.343
Second, Madison contends that the judge's oath to uphold the
law extends by implication to the "legal rule of interpreting a law,"
including the rule that directs the judge to give due regard to prece-
dents.Y The Constitution and statutes, in other words, must be in-
terpreted in light of settled rules of interpretation. Unless the legal
rule of stare decisis is arbitrarily omitted from the laws the judge has
sworn to uphold, the judicial oath provides no basis for adoption of the
judge's individual understanding of a constitutional provision at the
expense of precedent.
As noted above, Madison acknowledged that there were excep-
tions to the rule of stare decisis. Whatever the extent of Madison's
exceptions to the rule of stare decisis, however, he clearly believed
that they applied across the board to constitutional and other prece-
dents:
That there may be extraordinary and peculiar circumstances controlling the
rule in both cases, may be admitted; but with such exceptions the rule will
force itself on the practical judgment of the most ardent theorist. He will find
it impossible to adhere, and act officially upon, his solitary opinions as to the
343. See Paulsen, supra note 318, at 260 (asserting that a proper understanding of the judi-
cial oath "calls into question the validity of the doctrine of stare decisis (at least in its strongest
form)"). Paulsen attacks Madison's "explanation for his shift of positions on the bank" as "quite
problematic," in that it "would require subsequent generations of officeholders to treat the con-
stitutional interpretations of earlier generations as effectively amending the Constitution." Id.
In Paulsen's view, "[lt is difficult to square that view with an oath to support the Constitution,
which sets forth the amendment process in detail in Article V." Id. Paulsen's argument is
vulnerable on two counts. First, it overstates Madison's premise. Madison did not purport to
require the retention of constitutional precedent at all costs and in all circumstances, thus
"effectively amending the Constitution." Id. Instead, Madison merely rejected the assertion
that constitutional precedent should be categorically undervalued; he left room for the rejection
of all precedent in proper circumstances. Second, Paulsen's argument ignores the second aspect
of Madison's justification set forth below: that an oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of
the United States includes, by implication, established rules of interpreting those laws,
including standards of stare decisis.
344. Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in
MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 87, at 391-92; see also Kneeland, 15 Wis. at 522. The court
stated that:
[Iln giving due effect to the maxim of stare decisis, though its own views would be differ-
ent, it disregards neither the constitution nor the law, for both intended that this maxim
should have due effect in the judicial system which they established. The question is,
did the constitution itself intend that each judge should for all time decide upon [his]
own interpretation according to his own views, as though no decision had ever been
made, or did it intend that such decisions once made and acted on by the people so that
change would overthrow all the transactions of the past, should be followed by succeed-
ingjudges? Obviously the latter.
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meaning of the law or Constitution, in opposition to a construction reduced to
practice during a reasonable period of time.345
Madison's approach was reflective of the treatment of the doc-
trine by most other commentators of the nineteenth century. As
noted above, James Kent's Commentaries on American Law added one
important nuance to Blackstone's exception for error correction. Kent
recognized that the policy of stability and certainty was more impor-
tant in certain areas of the law (such as property rights) than in oth-
ers.346 Kent thus conceived of a sliding standard of deference for de-
cisions creating a rule of property, but no sliding scale was offered on
the constitutional, statutory, or other basis of the underlying law.
347
B. Constitutional and Statutory Precedent in the Marshall
and Taney Courts
The Marshall Court apparently perceived no stare decisis sig-
nificance in the constitutional or statutory nature of a precedent. As
the above summary of the Marshall Court's treatment of precedent
indicates, the Court during Marshall's tenure never suggested that
the nature of a decision would affect its precedential value. Its deci-
sions rarely had any opportunity to comment on the precedential
value of constitutional decisions, since most of its discussion of prece-
dent appeared in non-constitutional cases. When the treatment of
345. Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in
MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 87, at 392. Andrew Jackson expressed a contrary view in
vetoing an 1832 bill re-chartering the national bank. Jackson asserted that "[miere precedent is
a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of
constitutional power except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be
considered as well settled." Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 2 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139, 1144-45 (James D.
Richardson, M ed., 2d ed. 1912). Jackson was more impressed with the judicial oath argument
than was Madison. In his view, "[elach public officer who takes an oath to support the
Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by
others." But Jackson's opposition to precedent swept more broadly than that; Jackson objected
not only to the notion of deference to constitutional precedent, but to deference to any precedent
and to the very idea of judicial review. See 2 SAMUEL D. RIcHARDsON, A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 582 (1896) (asserting that "the opinion
of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the
judges, and on that point the President is independent of both").
346. See 1 KENT, supra note 94, at *477-78.
347. See J.C. WELLS, RES ADJUDICATA AND STARE DECISIS 562-63 (Des Moines, Iowa Mills
& Co. 1879) (concluding that the "maxim" of stare decisis was "fit and necessary to be applied to
questions which should arise in regard to" the meaning of the Constitution, that its application
in the constitutional and statutory realm should be "in the same manner it is applied to other
subjects," and that the differential standards of deference flowed not from the nature of the un-
derlying law being interpreted by the Court, but from the degree to which "titles and contracts"
were built around the decision).
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constitutional precedent arose, the Court made no mention of a dimin-
ished standard of deference, implicitly placing constitutional prece-
dent on at least an even plane with other decisions. In Ogden v.
Saunders, for example, Justice Washington's dictum suggested that
the Court's earlier interpretation of Congress's bankruptcy power had
controlling significance despite his continuing view that Sturges
wrongly interpreted that provision of Article I.3" Far from adopting a
diminished standard of deference to constitutional precedent,
Washington conceived of a standard that led him to set aside his own
view as "condemned by the decision of a majority of this Court, sol-
emnly pronounced."349
As discussed in detail above, the Taney Court's willingness to
overturn erroneous precedent turned entirely on its perception of
whether a change of course would affect property or contract rights.
350
Despite numerous opportunities in decisions considering the value of
statutory precedents, the Taney Court never mentioned the underly-
ing statutory nature of a decision as a basis for an enhanced standard
of deference. Thus, when the Court in Townsend v. Jemison alluded
to a previous statutory construction as "too strongly engrafted into the
law to be removed without the interposition of some superior author-
ity," 51 its conclusion was based on the presence of vested commercial
reliance interests, and not on the statutory nature of the decision.
And Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. claimed that adher-
ence to stare decisis was uniquely necessary under the circumstances
of that case, but again the assertion turned not on the statutory flavor
of the issue but on the "great and irreparable evil" that would be in-
flicted on property interests in the event of reversal.352
As to constitutional decisions, Professor Currie has suggested
that "the Court in Taney's own time would demonstrate that consti-
tutional precedents enjoyed no immunity from being overruled."
353
Professor Eskridge has drawn a similar conclusion.354 In fact, how-
348. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 263-64 (1827).
349. Id.
350. See discussion supra notes 235-94 and accompanying text.
351. Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407, 414 (1850); see also discussion supra
notes 247-53 and accompanying text.
352. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 325 (1853); see also dis-
cussion supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
353. CURRIE, supra note 98, at 226.
354. See Eskridge, supra note 325, at 1365 n.15. Eskridge's attribution to Taney of the no-
tion of diminished deference to constitutional authority is based on Taney's dissent in The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849). Taney's dissenting position in The Passenger




ever, except in a few isolated opinions of single Justices, the constitu-
tional dimension of a precedent was not considered relevant to the
stare decisis question in the Taney era.
The first opinion to suggest otherwise was Justice Daniel's
concurrence in the License Cases.355 The License Cases unanimously
upheld state prohibitions on selling imported liquor without a state
license, but there was no opinion for the Court and no consistent line
of analysis in any of the six seriatim opinions that were reported.356
The issue of deference to precedent arose with regard to the Court's
earlier decision in Brown v. Maryland, which had precluded Maryland
from collecting a license tax on imported goods so long as they
"remain[ed] the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the
original form or package in which it was imported."357 Chief Justice
Taney urged the resolution of two of the consolidated cases under this
original package doctrine, on the ground that the state regulations in
those two cases applied to liquor in broken packages. 358 As for the
third consolidated case, in which the regulation applied to liquor in its
original package, Taney concluded that the state retained concurrent
power to regulate interstate commerce. 359 Although the confusing and
lengthy opinions make difficult the task of divining a consistent line
of analysis, this latter point seems to have garnered majority support.
Justices Woodbury, Nelson, and Catron seemed to agree with Taney
that the commerce power was not exclusive.360
Justice Daniel concurred in the result urged by Taney, but
thought that the entire case should have been disposed of on the
ground that the interstate transaction ended once the liquor entered
the state, and that the states thus retained the power to regulate the
sale as a matter of local commerce. 361 Daniel also went out of his way
355. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504,611-18 (1847) (Daniel, J., concurring).
356. See SWISHER, supra note 236, at 372-73 (asserting that "if there had been a carry-over
from the Marshall period of the tradition of seeking unanimity among the Justices and speaking
through one voice, that ideal had now, by 1847, been largely abandoned with respect to critical
constitutional issues"). For further background on the License Cases, see CURRIE, supra note
98, at 225-26; SCHwARTZ, supra note 12, at 79-81.
357. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,442 (1827).
358. See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 574-75.
359. See id. at 579-80.
360. See id. at 601-08 (Catron, J., concurring); id. at 618-24 (Woodbury, J., concurring).
Nelson joined both Taney's and Catron's opinions. See id. at 618; see also CURRIE, supra note
98, at 226 (concluding that "four of the seven Justices who voted flatly and persuasively declared
that the commerce clause did not limit state power").
361. See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 614-16 (Daniel, J., concurring). As to the
exclusivity of the commerce power, Daniel seemed to agree with Taney, Woodbury, Nelson, and
Catron, at least where the state's exercise of power did not conflict "with some regulation actu-
ally established by Congress in virtue of that power." Id. at 615.
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to offer his disagreement with the original package doctrine of Brown
v. Maryland and to volunteer his groundbreaking view "that in
matters involving the meaning and integrity of the constitution," he
would "never... consent that the text of that instrument shall be
overlaid and smothered by the glosses of essay-writers, lecturers, and
commentators," or by judges whose decisions contravened his own
understanding as to the meaning of the Constitution.62 Daniel's
justification was the argument that Madison had considered and
rejected: that he had "been sworn to observe and maintain the
constitution," and could not "put [his] conscience" as to its meaning
"into commission.36s
Two years later, Chief Justice Taney expressed a similar view
in the Passenger Cases.3 4 These consolidated cases presented the is-
sue of the constitutionality of New York and Massachusetts statutes
charging ship captains per capita fees for passengers brought into the
respective states.365 Two principal questions were at stake: (1)
whether the express grant of power to Congress under the Commerce
Clause was exclusive of any parallel power in the States; and (2) even
assuming exclusivity of power under the Commerce Clause, whether
the States retained police powers encompassing the authority to levy
the fees at issue.3 66 By a bare five to four margin, the Court invali-
dated the per capita fees.367 The Court was again fractured, however,
with eight Justices authoring extensive opinions. Justice Wayne's
opinion argued (in contradiction to the apparent majority position in
the License Cases) that Congress's commerce power was exclusive,
and claimed the support of all five members of the majority.368 But
Catron and Grier, who voted to invalidate the fees, did so without
even discussing the Commerce Clause; their opinions were based on
the conclusion that the state statutes conflicted with certain congres-
sional statutes regulating commerce with Great Britain.369
Chief Justice Taney dissented. He cited the License Cases for
the proposition that the Commerce Clause was not an exclusive grant
362. Id. at 612.
363. Id.
364. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
365. See id, at 392-93, 409-10.
366. See id. at 393.
367. See id.
368. See id. at 410-15 (Wayne, J., concurring).
369. See id. at 437-52 (Catron, J., concurring); id. at 455-64 (Grier, J., concurring).
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of power.370 Under Taney's view of the official report of the License
Cases:
[F]ive of the justices of this court, being a majority of the whole bench, held
that the grant of the power to Congress was not a prohibition to the States to
make such regulations as they deemed necessary, in their own ports and
harbours, for the convenience of trade or the security of health .... 371
Notwithstanding his reading of the License Cases, Taney suggested
that the holding there should be subject to reexamination on the mer-
its:
After such opinions, judicially delivered, I had supposed that question to be
settled, so far as any question upon the construction of the Constitution ought
to be regarded as closed by the decision of this court. I do not, however, object
to the revision of it, and am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as the
law of this court, that its opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is
always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error,
and that its judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force
of the reasoning by which it is supported.
3 7 2
Taney's opinion offered no citation to Justice Daniel's dissent
in the License Cases, and he would have been hard-pressed to find any
other support for his view. Arguments from counsel in the Passenger
Cases reflected the then-prevailing view. David B. Ogden,373 counsel
for one of the ship captains who objected to the imposition of the per
capita fees, argued that doubtful questions should be decided based on
precedent, and that "adjudged cases upon points of doubtful
construction of the Constitution" are "peculiarly within the good sense
and principle of the rule."374 Opposing counsel made no effort to con-
tradict Ogden's view.
370. See id. at 470 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Ogden reportedly "argued more important cases before [the Marshall Court] than any
other American lawyer" except Daniel Webster and William Wirt, and Marshall is said to have
commented that "when [Ogden] had stated his case, it was already argued." CHARLES E.
WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 303-04 (1911).
374. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 292 (reporting Ogden's oral argument) (emphasis
added). Ogden reiterated the point as follows:
If, in ordinary questions, it is the interest of the public that there should be an end of
litigation as to what the law is, is it not emphatically the interest of the public that their
great organic law should be fixed and settled?-that, in points upon which the construc-
tion of the Constitution is doubtful, (and it could only be when that construction is
doubtful that the case could come before this court,) the construction given by adjudged
cases should be adhered to?... If in ordinary cases between man and man it is impor-
tant that the law should be settled, it seems to me that it is infinitely more important to
the community that the construction of the Constitution should be settled.
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Even Taney's dissent seemed cognizant of the novelty of his
position. When Taney took the detour in his opinion to diminish the
binding effect of the License Cases, he self-consciously offered a new
standard of deference in constitutional cases. Taney proposed that,
it be regarded hereafter as the law of this court, that its opinion upon the con-
struction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is supposed
to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority should hereafter
depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported.
3 7 5
When placed in historical context, the "hereafter" phrasing is signifi-
cant. Taney understood that until that time constitutional precedent
was on the same stare decisis plane as other decisions; 'hereafter" he
proposed a different rule.
The majority opinions in the Passenger Cases did not speak to
the proper treatment of precedent generally or to the License Cases in
particular, and it would be a mistake to infer that the Justices in the
majority subscribed to Taney's novel standard. The better reading of
the majority's treatment of the License Cases is simply that there was
no majority holding on the exclusivity of the commerce power.376 As
noted above, Justices Catron and Grier relied on statutory arguments,
and not on any conclusion as to the exclusivity of Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause. At this point, Daniel's and Taney's
views regarding constitutional precedent were likely viewed as dicta
in isolated opinions, not as a new standard to be taken seriously by
the Court.
Indeed, Taney himself provided support for this conclusion in
his majority opinion in The Genesee Chief, announced just two years
after the Passenger Cases. The Court's decision to overrule The
Thomas Jefferson's interpretation of the Admiralty Clause provided a
prime opportunity for Taney to adopt for the Court what he had pro-
posed as the rule "hereafter" in his dissent in the Passenger Cases. If
the majority had agreed that The Thomas Jefferson's construction of
the Admiralty Clause was "always open to discussion" because of its
perceived error, and that its authority depended solely "on the force of
Id. (emphasis added).
375. Id. at 470 (Taney, CJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
376. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 227 (suggesting that "there is room for doubt" as to
whether Grier and Catron agreed with the other majority Justices' conclusion that the com-
merce power was exclusive); SWISHER, supra note 236, at 389 (asserting that "the question of ex-
clusiveness was not pertinent" to the analysis of Justices Wayne, Grier, and Catron, since they
concluded that "the state statutes conflicted with Acts of Congress regulating commerce and
with treaties with Great Britain").
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the reasoning by which it [was] supported," surely Taney would have
said so. But instead of a categorical rule that constitutional decisions
are always open to discussion, Taney's opinion in The Genesee Chief
suggested that the level of deference owing to a precedent should turn
on whether reversal would "disturb" any "rights of property" or
"interfere with any contracts heretofore made." 77 If it would, Taney
concluded that the prior decision (whether constitutional, statutory,
or otherwise) must be adhered to "notwithstanding" the Court's con-
viction that it was "purely artificial and arbitrary as well as unjust."
378
The opposing opinions in Marshall reinforce this understand-
ing. As noted above, Justice Grier's majority opinion claimed adher-
ence to the Court's previous decision in Letson in holding that persons
who use the corporate form are presumptively treated as citizens of
the state in which they are located.3 79 In so doing, Grier noted that a
narrower conception of diversity jurisdiction would be disruptive of
existing reliance interests.380  Daniel dissented and stood alone in
suggesting that adherence to a constitutionally suspect decision would
be a violation of the duty to uphold the Constitution.38 ' Taney's ex-
periment with that idea apparently had ended.
Daniel's Marshall dissent is significant not only in demonstrat-
ing that his position was still an outlying minority view. It was also
the first articulation of the argument that has since carried the day in
justifying a diminished standard of deference to constitutional prece-
dent: that application of stare decisis to constitutional decisions "does
indeed cut off all hope of redress, of escape, or of redemption, unless
one may be looked for, however remote, in a single remedy-that
sharp remedy to be applied by the true original sovereignty abiding
with the States of this Union, namely, a reorganization of existing
institutions."
382
C. Constitutional Precedent in Historical Perspective
Thus, the notion of a diminished standard of deference to con-
stitutional precedent was generally rejected by founding-era commen-
tators, and drew only isolated support in opinions in the Taney era.
Under the prevailing view in the founding era and through the
377. The Propeller Genesee Chiefv. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443,458-59 (1851).
378. Id. at 457.
379. See Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314,328 (1853).
380. See id. at 325.
381. See id. at 344 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 347.
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Marshall and Taney years, exceptions to the rule of stare decisis
might condone the rejection of constitutional precedent, but any ex-
ceptions applied across the board irrespective of the constitutional na-
ture of the decision.
The first majority opinion to suggest otherwise appears to be
Justice Strong's opinion for the Court in the Legal Tender Cases.3 3 In
Hepburn v. Griswold,3 8 the Court had initially invalidated a con-
gressional statute that authorized the issuance of paper money and
declared it legal tender.385 Chief Justice Chase penned the majority
opinion, which turned on the conclusion that the issuance of paper
money was not an appropriate means of carrying out any of
Congress's enumerated powers under Article 1.386 Chase was joined by
Justices Nelson, Clifford, and Field. Justice Miller dissented, joined
by Justices Swayne and Davis.387 Chase claimed to have Justice
Grier's support in the majority opinion, but Grier resigned prior to the
Court's announcement of its decision.38s
Hepburn was met with wide predictions of the dire conse-
quences that were anticipated to flow from the decision,38 9 and two
new appointments to the Court followed quickly on its heels. One ap-
pointment filled the vacancy left by Grier's retirement; the other filled
a new position created by a statute that expanded the number of
Associate Justices to eight.390 The opinions in Hepburn were handed
down on February 7, 1870; Justice Strong was appointed on February
383. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553-54 (1871). Two years earlier, an-
other dissent had hinted at such an approach. See Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
439, 444 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting). In the Washington University case, Justice Miller dis-
sented from the majority's holding, in reliance on earlier decisions under the Contracts Clause,
that the Missouri legislature had granted an enforceable, permanent exemption from taxation
to the University. Id. at 440-41. Miller opined that the legislature had no power to grant such a
permanent exemption and added "that there may be questions touching the powers of legislative
bodies, which can never be finally closed by the decisions of a court." Id. at 444.
384. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869), overruled in part by The Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 457.
385. See id. at 625-26; see also The Legal Tender Act, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345, 345 (1862)
(current version codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (1994)).
386. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 617.
387. See id. at 626-39 (Miller, J., dissenting).
388. See id. at 626 (suggesting that Grier agreed that the statute was'unconstitutional as
applied to debts incurred before it was passed); 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 716-19 (1971)
(noting that Grier resigned under pressure from his colleagues before the decision was
announced from the bench).
389. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 156-57 (suggesting also that Hepburn was
"categorically correct in terms of original intention" of the framers); see also CURRIE, supra note
98, at 329 (suggesting that Hepburn "was an aberration in a history of generally sympathetic in-
terpretation of the affirmative grants of congressional power").
390. See The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 528 & n.81.
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18, 1870; and Justice Bradley was appointed on March 21, 1870.391
The newly constituted Court ordered argument in the Legal Tender
Cases and handed down its decision on May 1, 1871.392
This time, Justices Strong and Bradley joined the Hepburn
dissenters in upholding Congress's power, with Strong authoring the
majority opinion. Strong's opinion for the Court overtly overruled
Hepburn, and held "the acts of Congress constitutional as applied to
contracts made either before or after their passage."sgs Strong made
no effort to tie congressional power to any specific provision of Article
I, but vaguely suggested that the power could be inferred from Article
Strong's justification for rejecting Hepburn was twofold. First,
he questioned the adequacy of the Hepburn majority, in light of
Grier's resignation and the impending expansion of the number of
Associate Justices on the Court. 95 Second, Strong suggested that on
important constitutional questions, a different standard of stare deci-
sis applied:
We have been in the habit of treating cases involving a consideration of consti-
tutional power differently from those which concern merely private right. We
are not accustomed to hear them in the absence of a full court, if it can be
avoided. Even in cases involving only private rights, if convinced we had made
a mistake, we would hear another argument and correct our error. And it is no
unprecedented thing in courts of last resort... to overrule decisions previously
made. We agree this should not be done inconsiderately, but in the case of
such far-reaching consequences as the present, thoroughly convinced as we are
that Congress has not transgressed its powers, we regard it as our duty so to




393. Id. at 553. For a discussion of the public criticism that came in the wake of the Court's
self-reversal in the Legal Tender Cases, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 158.
394. See The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 534.
395. See id. at 553-54 ("That case was decided by a divided court, and by a court having a
less number of judges that the law then in existence provided this court shall have."). This
argument was challenged in several dissenting opinions. See id. at 571-72 (Chase, C.J.,
dissenting) (insisting that at the time Hepburn was decided, "[tlhe court was... full," and that
the Hepburn majority was a "majority of the court as then constituted, five judges out of eight");
id. at 604 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (noting that "[bly law the Supreme Court at that time
consisted of the Chief Justice and seven associate justices, the act of Congress having provided
that no vacancy in the office of associate justice should be filled until the number should be
reduced to six," and that "[flive of the number, including the Chief Justice, concurred in the
opinion in that case, and the judgment of the State court was affirmed, three of the associate
justices dissenting").
396. Id. at 554. Justice Bradley's concurrence echoed these same sentiments. See id. at
569-70 (Bradley, J., concurring) (suggesting that "[ojn a question relating to the power of the
government, where I am perfectly satisfied that it has the power, I can never consent to abide
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Strong's justification for overruling Hepburn thus attempted to
lay claim to the Court's supposed habit of treating constitutional cases
differently from those involving private rights.3 97 But Strong's refer-
ence to the Court's habit is misleading in this context. His sole cita-
tion for the Court's habit was Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky.398 Briscoe,
however, is hardly support for the notion of a relaxed standard of
stare decisis in constitutional cases. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
for the Court in Briscoe consisted of a single paragraph, which simply
noted the Court's practice of not rendering a decision in constitutional
cases unless a majority of the justices concurred in the judgment.
399
Thus, Briscoe literally supports the habit adverted to by Strong
of treating constitutional cases differently, but the difference in
treatment had nothing to do with stare decisis.400 By citing Briscoe
out of context, Strong created the illusion of a settled practice of as-
by a decision denying it, unless made with reasonable unanimity and acquiesced in by the
country," and that Hepburn was vulnerable because it was "recent" and "only made by a bare
majority").
397. See id. at 554.
398. See id. (citing Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118 (1834)).
399. See Briscoe, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 122. The court stated that:
The practice of this court is, not (except in cases of absolute necessity) to deliver any
judgment in cases where constitutional questions are involved, unless four judges concur
in opinion, thus making the decision that of a majority of the whole court. In the pre-
sent cases four judges do not concur in opinion as to the constitutional questions which
have been argued. The court therefore direct [sic] these cases to be reargued at the next
term, under the expectation that a larger number of the judges may then be present.
400. See The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 554. The various opinions in The
Legal Tender Cases disagreed as to whether the actual principle of Briscoe had been disregarded
in Hepburn. See supra note 395. The correct resolution of this issue turns, in part, on whether
Justice Grier's phantom vote for the majority opinion is credited. Without his vote, the
Hepburn majority was only four, less than a majority of the eight Justices then authorized to sit
on the bench. Chief Justice Chase understandably attempted to include Grier's concurrence in
his tally, Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 626, as did contemporaneous law review commentary,
which argued that "tuinder the rule of practice... of Briscoe v. Bank, this decision [in Hepburn]
was all, in point of regularity and authority, that the decision of any constitutional question or
case could be." D.H. Chamberlain, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis As Applied to Decisions of
Constitutional Questions, 3 HARV. L. REV. 125, 129 (1889). On the other hand, legal historians
have expressed some doubt about whether Grier actually agreed with the majority, see 6
FAMMAN, supra note 388, at 716-19, and Strong was probably on solid ground in asserting that
Grier's vote was technically irrelevant in light of his resignation before the formal announce-
ment of the decision in Hepburn.
Even so, Briscoe itself expressly left the matter of proceeding on a constitutional case with
less than a full majority of the "whole court" to the discretion of the Justices; it simply noted the
"practice" of the Court and left open the possibility of disregarding that practice "in cases of ab-
solute necessity." Briscoe, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 122. Moreover, the "whole court" after Justice
Grier's resignation arguably consisted (until confirmation of the new appointments) of only
seven members. If so, even a four-Justice majority constituted a "majority of the whole court"
under Briscoe.
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signing diminished precedential value to constitutional questions, but
that illusion did not become a reality until the twentieth century.
The novelty of Strong's approach is evident from an examina-
tion of contemporaneous legal commentary on the Court's decision. A
prominent response appeared in an article by D.H. Chamberlain in
the Harvard Law Review. 401 After rejecting various other bases of-
fered by Strong in support of the Court's decision to overrule
Hepburn,40 2 Chamberlain proceeded to express his outrage at the
novel suggestion that constitutional decisions were somehow of dimin-
ished precedential value:
What is there to soften the rigor or abate the force of this rule as applied to the
decisions of constitutional questions coming before courts? It will hardly be
claimed that convenience does not call for certainty in constitutional law as
loudly as in other matters or kinds of law. Judges Strong and Bradley dwell on
the far-reaching public consequences of the decision of constitutional ques-
tions, especially of "questions of constitutional power." No one questions it;
but it might seem that this consideration was one chief reason for holding
steadily by such a decision made upon full argument, and careful consideration
by a full court. We would admit all the considerations, all the qualifications,
urged by these most accomplished and upright judges,-though we do not see
how they applied to the legal-tender decisions of 1870,-but we cannot feel
their force in constitutional questions so much even as in matters of private
right.
403
With this background, Chamberlain stated the view that prevailed
through most of the nineteenth century-that the doctrine of stare
decisis applied at least as strongly to questions of constitutional law:
Whether, however, it was right and wise to reverse the first legal tender deci-
sion or not, or whether that case was a fair exception to the rule or not, it
would at first view appear to be more inconvenient for the whole people to be
in doubt as to matters of constitutional construction, than for a comparatively
few to be in doubt as to some point of commercial law, for example. A rule of
401. See Chamberlain, supra note 400. Chamberlain's article has been described as "the
first law review essay on stare decisis in constitutional law." Monaghan, supra note 2, at 744
n.128.
402. Chamberlain argued, for example, that "ft]he allusion made by Judge Strong, to the
court then consisting of less than the members provided by law, is inaccurate," Chamberlain,
supra note 400, at 128; that "[flive members of the court [in Hepburn] joined in the decision," so
that "[u]nder the rule of practice... of Briscoe v. Bank, this decision was all, in point of regular-
ity and authority, that the decision of any constitutional question or case could be," id. at 129;
and that the "bare" majority in Hepburn was actually a greater majority "in ratio" than the ma-
jority in the Legal Tender Cases that overruled Hepburn, id. at 129-30.
403. Id. at 130-31.
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constitutional construction can hardly be changed with less inconvenience or




Chamberlain concluded by emphasizing the novelty of Strong's
suggestion of a weaker rule of stare decisis in constitutional cases. To
his knowledge, there were no authorities that would support Strong's
approach; at that time, it was not even "regarded in the forum of the
profession or of jurists and judicious law-writers as an open ques-
tion."
405
In light of the discussion above, Chamberlain obviously over-
played his hand in shutting out the possibility of any authority for
Strong's approach. Justices Daniel and Taney had introduced the
concept of a lesser standard of deference to constitutional precedent in
their dissents in the License Cases and the Passenger Cases, respec-
tively. And a small minority of nineteenth-century commentators had
put constitutional precedent in a category of its own.40 But hyperbole
aside, Chamberlain's article does indicate that Strong's approach to
stare decisis in the Legal Tender Cases was still viewed as an aber-
ration.
Significantly, Strong's opinion itself made no effort to offer any
substantive argument for diminished deference to constitutional
precedent. Instead, Strong turned to the conclusion that whether the
case involves constitutional power or merely a private right, the Court
should correct its error if it is "thoroughly convinced" that it "made a
mistake."407 Bradley's concurrence is of similar effect. Instead of ar-
guing for a diminished standard of deference to all constitutional
404. Id. at 131.
405. Id. Not surprisingly, Chamberlain's position was criticized by some commentators.
See EvERETT V. ABBOT, JUSTICE AND THE MODERN LAW 77-78 (1913). Abbot wrote:
Any citizen, therefore, whose liberty or property is at stake, has an absolute constitu-
tional right to appear before the court and challenge its interpretations of the
Constitution, no matter how often they have been promulgated, upon the ground that
they are repugnant to its provisions. In other words, he has a constitutional right to as-
sert before the court itself that its decisions are themselves unconstitutional, and if he
can establish his assertion, the court is under a sworn duty to reverse itself, because it is
under a sworn duty to uphold the Constitution rather than its own opinions.
Id.; see also Louis B. Boudin, The Problem of Stare Decisis In Our Constitutional Theory, 8
N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 589, 598-99 (1931) (quoting Abbot and adopting the same view). But even
Chamberlain's critics acknowledged the novelty of their position, suggesting that it had
"perhaps never been openly advanced," ABBOT, supra, at 76-77, and that "the practice of the
courts and the almost unanimous opinion of the profession" was to the contrary, Boudin, supra,
at 598 (emphasis omitted).
406. See, e.g., 2 WARREN, supra note 112, at 749 (citing 4 WORKS OF GEORGE BANCROFT 549
(1852)) (To the decision of an underlying question of constitutional law no... finality attaches.
To endure, it must be right.").
407. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 554 (1871).
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precedent, Bradley simply concluded that the Court was entitled to
overrule a decision on a question of government power when there is
"public excitement on the subject" and the Court is "fully convinced"
that its former decision "was erroneous."408 Thus, Strong's and
Bradley's opinions provided a weak foundation for establishing a fu-
ture practice of diminished deference to constitutional precedent.
Indeed, the weakness of this foundation was evident the next
time the Court explicitly addressed the value of constitutional prece-
dent-in its income tax decisions in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co.409 Pollock presented what has since been characterized as "the
most contentious and emotion-laden" issue of the era:410 whether an
1894 income tax (or, more precisely, a tax on the income from prop-
erty) was unconstitutional as a direct tax that had not been appor-
tioned. The apportionment requirement is found in Article I, Sections
2 and 9, which provide that "direct Taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States... according to their respective Numbers," and
that "no Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken."4
1 1
The threshold issue in Pollock was whether the 1894 tax
qualified as a direct tax as that term is used in Article 1.412 The 1894
tax obviously had not been apportioned according to the population of
the various States, so the tax could survive only if it was deemed indi-
rect. Hylton v. United States arguably had held that only capitation
and real estate taxes qualified as direct taxes subject to the appor-
tionment requirement,413 and that understanding had prevailed for
408. Id. at 569-70 (Bradley, J., concurring).
409. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock 1), 157 U.S. 429 (1895), overruled by
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I/), 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
410. JOHN STEELE GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSiNG: THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE AND TIMES
OF OUR NATIONAL DEBT 86-87 (1997). For further discussion of the emotional attacks on the in-
come tax, including summary of arguments from counsel that it was "communistic," see
ScHwARTz, supra note 12, at 184.
411. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. § 9, cl. 4.
412. Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 558; see also Pollock H, 158 U.S. at 617-18.
413. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796). In Hylton, the Court
considered the constitutionality of "alan Act to lay duties upon carriages for the conveyance of
persons." Id. at 172 (Chase, J.). The seriatim opinions in Hylton unanimously upheld the car-
riage tax in the face of a challenge under the Direct Tax Clause. Four Justices participated,
three of whom authored opinions. All three suggested that only "capitation" and real estate
taxes qualified as "direct" taxes subject to the requirement of apportionment, but all three ex-
pressly equivocated on that point. Chase opined that the direct taxes "contemplated by the
Constitution are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax ... and a tax on LAND," but he went
out of his way to suggest that he was not giving a 'judicial opinion" on that point. Id- at 175.
Iredell agreed with Chase, but also expressed some doubt on the issue. See id. at 183. Paterson
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nearly a century.414 Counsel for Pollock (who brought the suit against
a corporation in which he held stock to prevent compliance with the
tax) recognized that limiting direct taxes to capitation and real estate
taxes would undermine a constitutional challenge to the income tax,
and thus counsel's arguments before the Court included an open invi-
tation to overrule a "century of error" regarding the meaning of "direct
taxes.'415
After initial arguments in Pollock, the Court (by a 6-2 vote,
Justice Jackson not participating because of an illness) struck down
the tax as applied to income from real estate, but left open (on a 4-4
vote) the validity of the tax as applied to income from personal prop-
erty.416 Chief Justice Fuller's opinion in Pollock I superficially re-
tained Hylton, and Fuller claimed that the Court's decision not to ex-
tend any decision upon a constitutional question properly preserved
the principle of stare decisis.
417
In light of the 4-4 vote in Pollock I on the constitutionality of
the income tax as applied to personal property, the Court reheard the
case, this time with all nine Justices participating. On rehearing,
Chief Justice Fuller garnered a fifth vote in favor of invalidating the
1894 income tax in its entirety. 418 In contrast to his opinion in
Pollock I, which superficially preserved the direct tax standard in
Hylton, Fuller's opinion in Pollock II clearly rejected the view that
direct taxes are limited to real estate and capitation taxes.41 9 Fuller
concluded that capitation and real estate taxes were the "principal" examples of direct taxes, but
he was unwilling to conclude that no other taxes could qualify. See id. at 177.
414. See, e.g., Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 546 (1869); Pacific Ins. Co. v.
Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 444-45 (1869).
415. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, TEE AMERIcAN SPREME CouRT 140-41 (1960).
416. See Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 586.
417. Id. at 579-80. Chief Justice Fuller's opinion for the Court in Pollock I concluded that
even accepting the Hylton conclusion that a tax on real estate is a direct tax, a tax on real estate
and a tax on income from real estate are constitutionally indistinguishable. Id. at 580-81.
Because both taxes diminish the value of property, Pollock I held that the apportionment
requirement applies to both. Id. at 579-80.
418. Justice Jackson dissented, so one Justice apparently switched sides and joined Fuller
in Pollock II. Most historical commentators have concluded that Justice Shiras was the one who
changed his mind. See 2 WARREN, supra note 112, at 700; Note, The Income Tax Decision, 29
AM. L. REV. 589, 589 (1895). But see SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 185 (stating that later
commentators have questioned whether it was Justice Shiras who changed his mind "or even
whether there was any switch at all" (citation omitted)).
419. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock 11), 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895):
We are now permitted to broaden the field of inquiry, and to determine to which of the
two great classes [direct or indirect] a tax upon a person's entire income, whether
derived from rents, or products, or otherwise, of real estate, or from bonds, stocks, or
other forms of personal property, belongs; and we are unable to conclude that the
enforced subtraction from the yield of all the owner's real or personal property, in the
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protested that there was "nothing in the Hylton case in conflict with
the foregoing,"420 but his disclaimer was hardly credible. Hylton
confined direct taxes to two narrow categories; Pollock II held that
direct taxes included any "general unapportioned tax, imposed upon
all property owners as a body for or in respect of their property,"
whether aimed at the property itself or at "the income therefrom."
421
If the Pollock majority had thought it could lay claim to a di-
minished standard of deference in constitutional cases under the
Legal Tender Cases, surely it would have done so. Instead, it re-
mained quiet while the dissent protested that stare decisis was of
particular importance under the circumstances:
If there be any weight at all to be given to the doctrine of stare decisis, it surely
ought to apply to a theory of constitutional construction, which has received
the deliberate sanction of this court in five cases, and upon the faith of which
Congress has enacted two income taxes at times when, in its judgment, ex-
traordinary sources of revenue were necessary to be made available.
422
Justice White's dissent in Pollock 11 is consistent with the prevailing
treatment of the issue by contemporaneous commentators. Instead of
adopting a categorical standard of deference for all constitutional
cases, White believed that the deference due to Hylton depended on
the extent of private property or contract rights built around that de-
cision.42
Despite Strong's majority opinion in the Legal Tender Cases,
early twentieth-century commentators generally adhered to the view
that constitutional decisions were at least as entitled to deference as
other decisions. Henry Campbell Black's Handbook on the Law of
Judicial Precedents, a self-proclaimed first offering of "a systematic
and comprehensive treatise on the law of judicial precedents,"
424
broadly asserted that "[t]he principle of stare decisis applies with
special force to the construction of constitutions, and an interpreta-
manner prescribed, is so different from a tax upon the property itself, that it is not a
direct, but an indirect tax, in the meaning of the Constitution.
420. Id. at 626.
421. Id. at 627.
422. Id. at 689 (Brown, J., dissenting).
423. See id. at 689-90:
I have always entertained the view that, in cases turning upon questions of jurisdiction,
or involving only the rights of private parties, courts should feel at liberty to settle
principles of law according to the opinions of their existing members, neither regardless
of, nor implicitly bound by, prior decisions, subject only to the condition that they do not
require the disturbance of settled rules of property.
424. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS OR THE
SCIENCE OF CASE LAW, at v (1912).
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tion once deliberately put upon the provisions of such an instrument
should not be departed from without grave reasons."
42 5
Black's treatment of this issue does not include a citation to
the Legal Tender Cases.426 Black may have viewed Strong's analy-
sis-in light of Pollock and subsequent cases-as such a "sport" that it
could be ignored even in a comprehensive treatise. Or he may have
interpreted Strong's approach simply to carve out a narrow exception
for constitutional decisions concurred in by a shaky majority of the
Court. Either way, that Black's comprehensive treatise conclusively
rejected any rule of diminished deference to constitutional decisions,
without even a citation to the Legal Tender Cases, provides further
support for the conclusion that the notion had not yet taken hold even
by the early twentieth century.
427
Thus, the prevailing doctrine of stare decisis at the time of the
framing and throughout the nineteenth century generally rejected the
notion of a diminished standard of deference to constitutional prece-
dent. When Justice Brandeis (dissenting in Burnet) sought to lay
claim to a purportedly longstanding position of the Court that consti-
tutional cases should readily be corrected where they are found in-
consistent with reason,42 the Court's actual position on that point had
been to treat constitutional precedent in the same way it treated
other decisions.
Despite its questionable historical pedigree, Brandeis' ap-
proach has been unquestioningly adopted by the modern Court. A key
turning point was Smith v. Allwright,429 which appears to be the first
majority opinion of the twentieth century to adopt the Brandeis vision
of diminished deference to constitutional precedent.43° Justice Reed's
425. Id. at 222.
426. Black's only citation to United States Supreme Court authority is to Pollock I, which
he cites for the proposition that the Court "is not required, under the rule of stare decisis, to
extend the scope of any decision upon a constitutional question, if it is convinced that error in
principle might supervene." Id. at 226.
427. Black acknowledged that constitutional decisions that establish a "rule of property"
might qualify for enhanced deference, but refused to accept a standard that would accord defer-
ence solely on the basis of the constitutional dimension of a decision. See id. at 225. A contrary
view had been advocated, however, in contemporaneous academic commentary. See Charles
Wallace Collins, Stare Decisis and the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 603
(1912) ("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is much weaker in the realm of constitutional
law .... Constitutional law is organic. It grows. It is an expression of the life of the social
organism.").
428. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
429. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
430. See id. at 664-65. The Smith Court overruled Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935),
overruled in part by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), in holding that a political party's
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majority opinion in Smith offered the following commentary on consti-
tutional precedent:
In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the desirability of continu-
ity of decision in constitutional questions. However, when convinced of former
error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. In constitu-
tional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon leg-
islative action this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power
to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions. This has long been ac-
cepted practice, and this practice has continued to this day.
431
Reed's position likely was unsurprising to those who were
familiar with the views he had expressed as Franklin D. Roosevelt's
Solicitor General. In that capacity, Reed had opined that a flexible
notion of stare decisis "should be most liberally applied" in the
"constitutional field," because "the court must test its conclusions by
the organic document, rather than precedent," and because
"legislation is often powerless to overcome questionable constitutional
decisions." 432 But Reed's sweeping claims to an accepted practice
throughout the Court's history were certainly questionable. Reed of-
fered no historical evidence for such an approach, relying exclusively
on Brandeis' Burnet dissent for his historical argument.
433
Since Smith, however, the notion of an accepted practice of a
diminished standard of deference to constitutional precedent has be-
come a reality. The modern Court rarely considers the precedential
value of a constitutional decision without adverting to the Brandeis
position in Burnet. Thus, at least in this respect, the modern Court's
overruling rhetoric appears to more liberally sanction the rejection of
precedent than did the doctrine of the early nineteenth century. If
the Rehnquist Court is bent on abandoning a constitutional decision,
it may do so with little more than a citation to Brandeis and Reed and
their self-fulfilling notion of an accepted practice. Such an approach
had not garnered majority support in the founding era.
denial of membership on the basis of race could constitute state action in violation of the
fifteenth amendment where party membership is a prerequisite to participation in a primary
election. Id.
43L Id. at 665 (footnotes omitted).
432. Stanley Reed, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Law, 35 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 131, 134
(1938).
433. Burnet, 321 U.S. at 665 n.9. Indeed, the only nineteenth-century opinion cited by
Reed is Pollock I, which is ironically offered as support for the "desirability of continuity of deci-
sion in constitutional questions." Id. at 665 n.8 (citing Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co.
(Pollock 1), 157 U.S. 429, 652 (1895)). Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion in Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944), raised the familiar theme of institutional integrity, complaining that the
Court's decisions on constitutional questions would thereafter be perceived as "a restricted
railroad ticket, good for this day and train only." Id. at 669 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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One may question, however, whether the current practice pro-
duces significantly different results than would be achieved under the
methodology of the founding era. In many cases, constitutional
precedent that is abandoned by the Court would prove vulnerable
even on grounds well accepted by the founding generation, such as the
existence of subsequent undermining authority or the absence of any
cognizable reliance interests. Theoretically, then, the doctrinal
change inaugurated by the modern Court's adoption of the
Brandeis/Reed position could make a difference in only a narrow cate-
gory of cases, where a constitutional decision remains unscathed by
subsequent decisions and supports arguably significant reliance in-
terests.
But as a practical matter, it seems doubtful that the current
Court would be anxious to overrule itself under such circumstances.
In fact, the Rehnquist Court's practice to date suggests that the con-
stitutional nature of a decision has been insufficient by itself to justify
a reversal of precedent. Whenever the Rehnquist Court has overruled
constitutional precedent, significant reliance interests have been no-
tably absent3 or other authority has undermined the decision in
question.435 In each instance, the Court easily could have abandoned
434. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 520-21 (1995) (overruling Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929), in holding that the element of "materiality" was a matter of
fact to be decided by the jury, and not a matter of law to be resolved by the court, and noting
that Sinclair's precedential value is minimal because it established a "procedural rule... which
does not serve as a guide to lawful behavior"); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
233-34 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), holding that all
race-based governmental classifications must be analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard, and
noting that "reliance on a case that has recently departed from precedent is likely to be mini-
mal, particularly where, as here, the rule set forth in that case [Metro Broadcasting] is unlikely
to affect primary conduct in any event"); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)
(suggesting that the Court's prior decisions precluding victim-impact evidence in capital cases
under the Eighth Amendment were ripe for rejection because cases "involving procedural and
evidentiary rules" do not sustain significant reliance interests).
435. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (suggesting that the Court's prior
decisions holding that the Establishment Clause precluded federal funding were ripe for
reversal since there had been a "significant change in or subsequent development of our consti-
tutional law"); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in which a plurality had upheld Congress's power to abrogate
a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity by unequivocally expressing its intent to do so, and
noting that Union Gas was a "solitary departure from established law" and was of"questionable
precedential value, largely because a majority of the [Union Gas] Court expressly disagreed
with the rationale of the plurality"); Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 520-21 (overruling Sinclair v. United
States in holding that the element of "materiality" was a matter of fact to be decided by the jury,
and not a matter of law to be resolved by the court, and noting that Sinclair's "underpinnings"
had been "eroded... by subsequent decisions of this Court"); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S.
688, 704, 709-11 (1993) (abandoning the Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), "same conduct"
test under the Double Jeopardy Clause and asserting that Grady was "wholly inconsistent with
earlier Supreme Court precedent," and that Grady's foundations were undermined by United
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earlier constitutional authority without the modern crutch of dimin-
ished deference to constitutional decisions.
Agostini v. Felton illustrates the point.436 Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in Agostini overruled Aguilar v. Felton4 7 and School
District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,"8 which had held that the
Establishment Clause prohibited federal funding of a program provid-
ing remedial education to sectarian schools on a neutral basis with
other schools.4 9 In so doing, O'Connor dutifuily recited the Brandeis
position that although" 'in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right,'" stare
decisis "is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because
our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or
by overruling our prior decisions."44°
But the Brandeis crutch was hardly necessary. O'Connor
persuasively argued that since Ball and Aguilar, more recent
Establishment Clause jurisprudence had altered "the criteria used to
assess whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect."" 1 And
O'Connor easily could have argued that precedent precluding govern-
mental support for remedial education in parochial schools could
hardly sustain any significant reliance interests." 2 The Court's
rhetoric on constitutional precedent may have broadened since the
founding era, but its practice is explainable under standards with a
long historical pedigree.
D. Statutory Precedent in Historical Perspective
The notion of an enhanced standard of deference to statutory
precedent apparently had not occurred to founding-era commentators,
States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992), which "recognize[d] a large exception" that "avoid[ed] a
'literal' (i.e., faithful) reading of Grady").
436. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203.
437. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled byAgostini, 521 U.S. at 203.
438. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,400 (1985), overruled byAgostini, 521 U.S. at 203.
439. Ball, 473 U.S. at 397.
440. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
441. Id. at 223. But see id. at 253 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quarreling with O'Connor's
reading of subsequent authority and arguing that no subsequent case "has held that there need
be no concern about a risk that publicly paid school teachers may further religious doctrine").
442. As I explain in further detail in a forthcoming article, a decision proscribing the
provision of Title I services within parochial schools could not be expected to sustain the same
sort of institutional investment that would be built around a decision authorizing governmental
action. And although there undoubtedly had been some investment in facilities for providing
such services offthe premises of the schools, the existence of such sunk costs is not an argument
for imposing further such costs. See Lee, supra note 320, sec. VI.
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or to the Supreme Court in the Marshall and Taney years. In the
founding generation, the only sliding standard of deference depended
on the extent of commercial reliance interests, not on the statutory or
constitutional character of the underlying issue. Thus, although the
Court in the nineteenth century had recognized that judicial con-
struction of a statute might be thought to "become[ I... as much a
part of the statute as the text itself," that conclusion generally applied
only "so far as contract rights acquired under it [the statute] are con-
cerned."443
Seeds of the modern theory of tacit congressional approval
were sown in Justice Brown's opinion for the Court in Sessions v.
Romadka."" In that case, defendants responded to a charge of patent
infringement by asserting that plaintiffs patent "was invalid by rea-
son of the joinder of distinct inventions in the same patent."
s
Plaintiff countered by entering a disclaimer of unrelated inventions
included in the patent under a federal statute permitting a patentee
to disclaim unwanted portions of a patent."6 Despite language in the
statute stating that a disclaimer shall not affect pending actions,"7
the Court had previously held that a plaintiff could preserve the right
to prevail on the merits by entering a disclaimer after filing the suit,
and that the only effect of filing a disclaimer after the commencement
of the suit was to prevent the plaintiff from recovering costs from the
defendant." 8 The Sessions Court stood by the Court's statutory
precedent, and expressly relied on Congress's failure to reject the
Court's construction when it reenacted the statute: "Congress, having
in the Revised Statutes adopted the language used in the act of 1837,
must be considered to have adopted also the construction given by
this court to this sentence, and made it a part of the enactment." 9
The modern approach to statutory precedent crystallized in a
series of opinions in the Hughes Court. Justice Stone initially led the
443. Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879). The statute at issue in Douglass
was a Missouri law regarding the issuance of municipal bonds. Id. at 678. Plaintiff Douglass
had purchased certain bonds at a time when prevailing judicial authority construed the statute
to authorize their issuance. See id. It was in this context that the Supreme Court rejected the
government's challenge to those decisions. See id. at 687. Douglass had clearly relied on
prevailing judicial authority in acquiring the bonds, and accordingly the former judicial
construction had become "as much a part of the statute as the text itself." Id.; see also BLACK,
supra note 424.
444. Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29 (1892).
445. Id. at 40.
446. See id. (quoting Section 4917 of the Revised Statute).
447. See id. at 41.
448. See id. at 42.
449. Id.
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charge. Taking a cue from Sessions, Stone and his colleagues held
that when Congress reenacts a statute without changing the language
previously construed in the Court's precedents, it "must be considered
to have adopted the consistent interpretation of the latter,"450 and
sometimes even that congressional inaction in the face of statutory
precedent indicates that "the interpretation of the Act... has legisla-
tive approval."451 Although the Hughes Court sometimes equivocated
on this latter point,452 the Court's occasional mistrust of congressional
silence has gradually given way to the notion that statutory precedent
is per se entitled to great weight.453
This approach is another departure from founding-era princi-
ples. But again, one may question whether it actually affects out-
comes. The question is not easily answered. When the Court ex-
pressly declines to overrule a statutory decision, the precise role of a
rule of enhanced deference may be difficult to isolate from any of a
number of other factors that may point in the same direction.
Regardless of the statutory dimension of the precedent, the Court may
conclude that the error in the decision is insufficiently clear to justify
undermining the policies of stability and institutional integrity,45 or
450. United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931) (citing Sessions, 145 U.S. at 29); see
also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940) (stating that the "long time failure
of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed... is persuasive of legislative
recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one," especially where the issue has
"brought forth sharply conflicting views both on the Court and in Congress"); Missouri v. Ross,
299 U.S. 72, 75 (1936) (citing Sessions, 145 U.S. at 29) (asserting that congressional inaction is
"persuasive evidence of the adoption by that body of the judicial construction," at least where
Congress has amended the statute in question "in other particulars" and has not changed the
language at issue). For further discussion of Justice Stone's views on statutory precedent, see
Eskridge, supra note 325, at 1365-66.
451. United States v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 492,500 (1936).
452. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) (suggesting that "congressional
silence" is insufficient to suggest "adoption of a controlling rule of law" in a previous decision);
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1940) (concluding that "[it would require very per-
suasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this Court from reexamining
its own doctrines," and that mere inaction cannot be "tantamount to an estoppel barring reex-
amination by this Court of distinctions which it had drawn").
453. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) ("The fact that
inaction may not always provide crystalline revelation.., should not obscure the fact that it
may be probative to varying degrees."); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357
(1953) (per curiam).
454. See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 285 (1996). At issue in Neal was the de-
cision in Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 468 (1991), which had held that a sentencing
court is required to take into account the weight of "blotter paper" with its absorbed LSD in de-
termining whether the weight of the drug justifies the mandatory minimum sentence. In pre-
serving Chapman, the Neal Court repeatedly referred to the Court's "reluctance to overturn
[statutory] precedents," to the notion that the Court "give[s] great weight to stare decisis in the
area of statutory construction," and to the rationale "that 'Congress is free to change this
Court's interpretation of its legislation.'" Id. at 295 (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 736 (1977)). But despite this rhetoric, it is not at all clear that the statutory dimen-
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that significant reliance interests counsel against reversal.455 And de-
spite the super-strong presumption in favor of statutory precedent,46
the Court has overruled a significant number of statutory decisions
under a familiar body of exceptions to the rule of adherence to statu-
tory precedent. 4 7 Thus, although the super-strong presumption may
discourage the Court from reexamining statutory decisions that it
would otherwise scrutinize more closely, its impact is difficult to sepa-
rate from other longstanding strands of the doctrine of stare decisis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Rumors of the recent demise of the Supreme Court's doctrine
of precedent are greatly exaggerated.48 For the most part, the inter-
sion of Chapman had anything to do with the result in Neal. Kennedy's first-line argument was
that Chapman was correct on the merits, and his lofty commentary on stare decisis came only
after he first assumed away his conclusion on the merits "for argument's sake." Id. at 294.
455. See, e.g., Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991). The
Hilton Court refused to overrule Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), which held
that FELA creates a cause of action against a state-owned railroad enforceable in state court.
Although the Court emphasized that "[clonsiderations of stare decisis have special force in the
area of statutory interpretation," Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202, it might have easily preserved Parden
solely on its alternative justification that "overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights
and expectations." Id. (noting that "[wiorkers' compensation laws in many States specifically
exclude railroad workers from their coverage because of the assumption that FELA provides
adequate protection"); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995)
(refusing to overrule Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and its extension of the
Federal Arbitration Act to the state courts and noting that since that decision, "private parties
have likely written contracts relying upon Southland as authority").
456. William Eskridge coined this label for the presumption. See Eskridge, supra note 325,
at 1362.
457. See id. at 1369 (asserting that "[tjhe willingness of the Supreme Court to reconsider
statutory precedents depends upon: (1) the thoroughness of the Courtes consideration of the is-
sue in the precedent; (2) the degree to which Congress has left development of the statutory
scheme to the courts; and (3) the degree to which the precedent has generated public and pri-
vate reliance"). The Rehnquist Court's statutory overrulings generally follow the pattern de-
scribed by Eskridge. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 118 S. Ct. 1969, 1977-78
(1998) (overruling House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945), and its construction of the Court's
certiorari jurisdiction because it was "rendered without full briefing or argumen"); State Oil Co.
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), and its
construction of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and asserting that "the general presumption that
legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in
light of the accepted view that Congress 'expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.'" (quoting National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714 (1995)
(overruling United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), and its interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §
1001 and concluding that "the reliance interests at stake in adhering to Bramblett are notably
modest").
458. Several minor strands of the Rehnquist Coures overruling rhetoric beyond those
treated in detail herein also seem to trace their roots deep in history. Compare Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 571-72 (1993) (superseded by statute)
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nal inconsistencies and contradictions in the Rehnquist Court's over-
ruling rhetoric are the product of an inherent tension in the counter-
vailing policies at stake, not of a recent deterioration of historically
stringent standards of stare decisis. 459
In the founding era as in the Rehnquist Court, the primary
tension concerned the extent of the Court's power to overrule deci-
sions now deemed erroneous. The solution conceived by Blackstone
and his contemporaries was to recognize a single exception to the rule
of stare decisis, an exception that charted a compromise course be-
tween the extreme positions advocated in the Rehnquist Court's
opinions in acknowledging a limited capacity for correction of prece-
dents deemed clearly contrary to reason. The Marshall Court's deci-
sions generally reinforce the limited nature of this exception; they
also provide evidence of the historical roots of some of the Rehnquist
Court's overruling rhetoric, principally the notion of diminished def-
erence to precedent undermined by subsequent authority. History
also supports the Rehnquist Court's notion that the rule of stare de-
cisis is strongest in cases involving commercial reliance interests, but
that error correction is freely available where no such interests are at
stake. That approach gained acceptance in English cases and
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) (superseded by statute), could be "reexamined consistently with principles of
stare decisis" since the narrow Free Exercise Clause rule announced there "was not subject to
full-dress argument' prior to its announcement" (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676-77
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)), and Girard v. Taggart, 5 Serg. & Rawle 19, 35 (Pa. 1818)
(overruling Willing v. Rowland, 4 Dall. 106 (Pa. 1791), and noting that Willing was not "a
solemn determination of the Supreme Court on debate," but "was given in the hurry of a jury-
trial, on a point not made by the counsel, on which there had been no argument"), and 1 KENT,
supra note 94, at *475-76 ("If a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature de-
liberation, the presumption is in favor of its correctness."), with South Carolina v. Gathers, 490
U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe respect accorded prior decisions increases,
rather than decreases, with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence, and
the surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity."), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991), and JAMES RAM, THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL JUDGMENT 201 (New York, Baker,
Voorhis, & Co. 1871) ("A circumstance that strengthens the authoritative force of a decision is,
that it has stood as law for a length of time, as 'for forty years together, or nearly forty years, or
nearly thirty-four years.'" (citing founding-era English cases)).
459. Frustration at confusion and inconsistency in the doctrine of stare decisis is hardly
unique to the modem era. See CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 26 ("The doctrine of stare decisis
may be said to be a much abused doctrine. It has pointed many a sneer, feathered many a shaft
hurled at the law, as well as its professors and practitioners. Essayists, in other fields, have
satirized it as a barren and illogical dogma."); EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES § 95,
at 106-07 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 2d ed. 1894) (noting the internal conflict in the policies
underlying the doctrine of stare decisis and complaining that "the courts attempt to conceal this
conflict, although they state each of the principles in emphatic language and follow now one of
them and now the other," and "usually pretend to follow [the principle of stare decisis] even
when they are going in precisely the opposite direction").
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American commentary in the founding era, and it was the primary
standard applied throughout the Taney era.
At least one strand of the Rehnquist Court's doctrine of prece-
dent appears to be a product of the twentieth century. The notion
that the constitutional or statutory nature of a precedent affects its
susceptibility to reversal was largely rejected in the founding era and
did not gain majority support until well into the twentieth century.
Even here, however, the results in the Rehnquist Court are largely
explainable under longstanding stare decisis principles.

